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1.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Despite significant advancements in modern medicine, death remains our inevitable 
destiny; be it by accident, disease, illness or old age. Owing to the universal 
applicability of mortality, death is a particularly delicate and emotionally evocative 
issue, and thus, there are numerous viewpoints on the value of life and the principles 
which should govern its cessation. Moreover, significant medical advancements now 
enable individuals to live longer with a variety of illnesses and diseases, and 
consequently, the controversy pertaining to end of life has further intensified, being 
thrust to the forefront of social debate. As a result of the increasing prominence 
surrounding the end of life debate, the law developed to govern its regulation has 
become subject to ever-intensifying scrutiny. At the core of this controversy is the s.2 
Suicide Act 1961, which served to decriminalise the practice of taking one‘s own life. 
However, what makes the Act contentious is that it is extremely unusual for a practice 
to be lawful, where assisting in that practice is unlawful; yet assisted suicide remains 
a crime. Any person who intentionally ―encourage[s] or assist[s] the suicide or 
attempted suicide of another person‖ faces a sentence of up to fourteen years 
imprisonment.
1
 Moreover, the Suicide Act is simply the central piece of legislation in 
a web of interrelated controversies surrounding end of life decisions. As the nature of 
death has become more complex, and the situations in which it arises have become 
more varied, the law has developed to draw a line between what is permissible and 
what is impermissible. The central purpose of this thesis is to ascertain whether the 
current legal system is justified in the positioning of this line.  
 
1.1 Aims 
 
The first aim of this thesis is to analyse the current law regarding end of life decisions 
and to address the distinctions it makes between permissible end of life choices and 
impermissible end of life choices. Let us consider a hypothetical example in order to 
frame the key issues: 
                                               
1 Ibid at s.2(1) and 2(4).   
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Imagine Alice, your eldest sister, is involved in a horrific car accident where 
her husband and three children tragically pass away. After the funeral, Alice discovers 
that her husband had acquired over two hundred thousand pounds worth of debt, all of 
which passes into her hands. Alice truly believes that her life has lost all sense of 
purpose and no longer wishes to continue living. One evening, Alice takes a lethal 
dose of paracetamol and ends her life.  
Beatrice was driving the car which collided with that of Alice and her family. 
Although Beatrice survives, she is left severely paralysed retaining only the 
movement of her eyelids and in need of artificial ventilation. Prior to the collision, 
Beatrice was set to compete in the 2012 Olympic Games as a professional gymnast. 
Her life revolved around actively participating in sporting events and travelling the 
world as a spectator. Consequently, Beatrice feels that her life had lost all value and 
wishes to commit suicide. Unlike Alice, she is unable to do so unaided. Nevertheless, 
Beatrice is able to refuse any further medical treatment, and thus, the ventilation is 
removed and she passes away.   
In that same hospital, Candice had spent the past twelve months receiving 
treatment for bone cancer. However, the cancer persists through continual 
chemotherapy and radiation sessions, and thus, the doctors eventually classify 
Candice‘s situation as terminal. Over the past year her family had watched her 
condition deteriorate and the pain she was suffering intensify. Candice makes the 
decision that she no longer wishes to cope with the constant physical agony and that 
she does not want her family to have to watch her deteriorate any further. Unlike 
Alice, Candice is too weak to end her own life and, unlike Beatrice, Candice is not 
receiving any life-sustaining treatment. Instead, after loving goodbyes, Candice 
requests that the doctor administer a dose of palliative drugs strong enough to ease her 
pain, a dose which she is aware is likely to result in her peaceful death.  
Now imagine that you have been suffering from Motor Neurone disease,
2
 a 
progressive neurodegenerative condition which leads to wasting of muscles, for over 
ten years. Your condition has deteriorated to the extent that you are wheelchair bound, 
paralysed from the neck down and struggle to communicate on the most basic level. 
You know that it is only a matter of months before your diaphragm is damaged and 
                                               
2 Note that I have chosen this condition as one which often causes mainly mental anguish as opposed to 
physical pain, and one in which the sufferer is rendered paralysed. Although I have chosen a physical 
illness, I could have equally chosen a mental illness which has caused the same desire to end life.  
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you suffocate to death. However, you would prefer to die peacefully and at your time 
of choosing, surrounded by your closest family members. After suffering at the hands 
of such a terrible illness, which effectively takes control of your entire life, you wish 
to make the final decision, something you believe will provide you with a dignified 
ending. Unlike Alice, Beatrice and Candice, your ability to choose the time and 
manner of your own death is severely constrained by the law. You are unable to take 
your own life without assistance, have no life-sustaining treatment to refuse and do 
not require palliative drugs. What is more, s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961 makes it a 
criminal offence for anyone to assist in your suicide. Simply because of your physical 
and medical situation, your ability to exercise choice over your parting moments is 
curtailed: Is this fair? This thesis seeks to answer such a question in the negative. The 
law allows particular categories of people to make decisions regarding the manner and 
timing of their death, but prohibits others, creating severe inequality.  
The second aim of this thesis is to address the question of whether this 
unfairness can be justified by some broader reasoning: can the distinctions employed 
by the law be defended with reference to any moral or legal standard? The initial 
category of justification that will be discussed is that which appeals to the inherent 
dignity or sanctity of human life. Such positions hold that all innocent human life is 
sacred, or inherently valuable, and thus, should never intentionally be taken.
3
 It will 
be argued that such claims are not compatible with the current law and that the 
distinctions employed by this viewpoint cannot withstand any deep analysis. 
The second category of justification which can be invoked in defence of the 
current legal position is that which appeals to the rights of others. In 2002 the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR) accepted that Art.8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR), the right to private and 
family life, includes the right to choose the manner and timing of one‘s death.4 
However, the Court ruled that the Suicide Act‘s imposition of a blanket prohibition on 
assisted suicide was justifiable under Art.8(2), for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. The Court explained that the justification for the Suicide Act 1961 
is that it ―was designed to safeguard life by protecting the weak and vulnerable and 
especially those who are not in a condition to take informed decisions against acts 
                                               
3 For example, see Keown (2002a) at 39-51. 
4 Pretty v UK (No. 2346/02) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1. 
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intended to end life or to assist in ending life‖.5 The fear is that a system which 
permits assisted death would be open to abuse and would pressurise the vulnerable, 
elderly or sick to request an early death. This thesis will critique such claims on two 
grounds. Most simply, the suggestion that the legalisation of assisted suicide would 
lead to such outcomes has not been proven. There is a lack of evidence, both 
empirically and logically, that must be established if this justification is to hold any 
weight. Secondly, it must also be demonstrated that the predicted negative outcome of 
legalisation would be worse than the current injustice created by the law. Finally, the 
law governing other end of life situations, such as the removal of life-sustaining 
medical treatment or the administration of a fatal dose of palliative care, is 
inconsistent with this defence.  
 
1.2 Structure 
 
The thesis is structured in two parts to reflect the two aims. Part One comprises of 
Chapters Two to Four and will address the distinctions made by the law at end of life, 
assessing whether their effects can rightly be classified as ‗fair‘. Chapter Two focuses 
on the distinction made between those receiving life-sustaining medical treatment and 
those who are not. Chapter Three addresses the distinction made between those 
people who require palliative care and those who do not. Chapter Four makes an 
analysis of the distinction the law makes between those who are able-bodied and 
those who are disabled. Through exploiting the justificatory weaknesses of such 
dichotomies, and illustrating how seemingly irrelevant criteria can affect one‘s ability 
to choose to die, I seek to reveal the unfairness of the current law.  
 Part Two comprises Chapters Five to Six and seeks to demonstrate that the 
unfairness unveiled in Part One cannot be justified by reference to some wider theory 
or doctrine. Chapter Five will address claims to ‗the rights of the self‘; the idea that 
particular choices should be constrained to protect the self. This chapter deals mainly 
with the broader argument regarding human dignity, and the more specific doctrine, 
the sanctity of life. Chapter Six is an analysis of appeals to ‗the rights of others‘; the 
suggestion that particular actions should be prohibited to protect others in society. 
This section focuses mainly on slippery slope arguments and how they shape the end 
of life debate.  
                                               
5 Pretty v UK (No. 2346/02) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1 at [74].  
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 Finally, I seek to conclude that the law is unjustifiably unfair, and thus, is in 
urgent need of reform. While the thesis does not, at any great length, attempt to 
suggest a comprehensive way forward, possibilities are touched upon throughout, and 
Chapter Seven draws conclusions from these findings. It is suggested that while 
legislative change is unlikely given the continual rejection of such Bills in 
Parliament,
6
 there is a possibility which has yet to be fully explored. The thesis 
reveals that the debate is currently centred on ‗others in society‘ who are seen as 
vulnerable to harm if assisted suicide were legalised. This is often at the expense of 
those vulnerable individuals who are actually suffering severe harm as they are 
prohibited from exercising choice over their final moments. Article 3 of the ECHR 
and its potential to help reconfigure the end of life debate are discussed. Those denied 
access to assistance in ending life are forced to suffer and inhumane and degrading 
life, and the possibility of this article providing an alternative angle from which to 
seek legalisation of assisted suicide, concludes this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 For example, the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2005 which was rejected 191 votes to 141. 
More recently Lord Falconer attempted to persuade Parliament to amend the Coroners and Justice Bill 
2009 to effectively legalise accompanying a loved one to travel abroad to die. The Falconer 
Amendment was also rejected by 194 voted to 141; see HL Deb 7 July 2009 vol 712 cols 595-634.  
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PART ONE  
 
THE CURRENT LEGAL POSITION 
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2.  
ARBITRARY DISTINCTION ONE: 
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT vs. NO LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Let us recall the hypothetical story mapped out in the introduction to this thesis, and 
in particular, Beatrice. Beatrice was the Olympic gymnast involved in a horrific car 
accident, rendering her severely paralysed and in need of artificial ventilation. After 
making the decision to end her life, Beatrice was able to refuse the life-sustaining 
medical treatment she was receiving – the artificial ventilation – which was duly 
removed, resulting in her death. You, however, a sufferer of Motor Neurone disease, 
paralysed from the neck down with only months to live, cannot make that same 
choice. You have no life-sustaining treatment to refuse and no on can legally assist 
you. How is it fair that Beatrice can legally choose to end her suffering, but you, 
simply because of circumstance, must suffer until the very end against your will? This 
chapter seeks to explore the justifications given as to why those in Beatrice‘s situation 
can make the choice to end their life, but others cannot. Can such reasoning withstand 
critical analysis? If not, we face an extremely unfair legal position which permits 
certain categories of people to make the choice to end life, but arbitrarily prohibits 
others.  
The legal position stipulates that any competent person may lawfully refuse 
medical treatment, even where such treatment is necessary to sustain life.
7
 The result 
is that individuals receiving such vital medical care may essentially obtain assistance 
in ending their own life. In the case of Ms B, she felt her life was no longer worth 
living and consequently requested the artificial ventilation keeping her alive be 
removed.
8
 The Court held that the doctors were legally obliged to comply with her 
wish.
9
 However, assisting in the suicide of another is a criminal offence under s.2 
                                               
7 Re T [1993] Fam. 95. 
8 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical treatment) [2002] EWHC 429. 
9 Ibid.  
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Suicide Act 1961, and more seriously, intentionally taking the life of an innocent 
human being amounts to murder. Why, then, is a doctor legally required to comply 
with a competent patient‘s refusal of treatment, even where this will lead to the 
inevitable death of that patient? Is it fair that a patient who requires life-sustaining 
medical treatment may choose to receive assistance when they choose to die, whereas 
others are legally prohibited to obtain the very same aid? This section explores such 
questions through an analysis of the current law and an assessment of whether such a 
distinction can be conceptually or morally defended.   
 
2.2 The Legal Position 
 
It is now a well-established principle of medical law that every competent patient has the right 
to refuse medical treatment even where death will inevitably result.
10
 Furthermore, a medical 
professional is legally required to comply with such a refusal, as any treatment contrary to the 
wishes of the patient will be ―an assault, a civil trespass to the person and a crime‖.11 In 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, Lord Goff reiterated the importance of autonomy at the 
end of life, and stated that where a patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, ―the 
principle of sanctity of human life must yield to the principle of self-determination‖.12  
Anthony Bland was a victim of the terrible sporting disaster at Hillsborough in 1989. In the 
accident, his ribs and lungs were crushed, severely restricting oxygen to his brain and causing 
irreversible damage. As a result, Bland was left in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), 
meaning that although he was unconscious with no cortical activity, his brain-stem was 
functioning and he could breathe unaided. Given the futility of Bland‘s situation, the Trust 
applied for a court declaration to ascertain whether it would be lawful to remove artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH), administered through a nasogastric tube, which would result 
in his death. The Lords held that the removal of the tube would be lawful. 
Additional evidence that the legal position is one grounded in the importance 
of end of life decision-making, is that the right to refuse medical treatment is almost 
absolute, with only limited exceptions made by mental health legislation and by the 
common law for public policy reasons (such as s.63 of the amended Mental Health Act 
1983). For example, again in the case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, the Lords 
                                               
10 Re T [1993] Fam. 95. 
11 Ibid at 100 per Ward J. 
12 [1993] A.C. 789 at 865 per Lord Goff. 
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implied that a patient cannot refuse basic care such as warmth and hygiene.
13
 The 
purpose of this minimal exception is to protect the autonomous interests of others. For 
example, the interests of other patients on the ward, the care staff, nurses, doctors and 
family members who have to interact with the patient regularly. Hence, Grubb has 
commented that the ―interests of third parties such as nurses…outweigh his interests 
in this singular situation‖.14  
Furthermore, the courts have chosen to interpret the exception extremely 
narrowly, reiterating the importance of autonomous choice at the end of life. In Bland, 
the issue arose as to whether the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration 
(ANH) through a nasogastric tube could be lawfully removed. If ANH constituted 
basic care, it could not lawfully be removed. However, the Lords in this case 
compared tube-feeding to the use of an artificial ventilator, holding that ANH was in 
fact medical treatment and could lawfully be removed.
15
  
Although this case concerned an incompetent patient, the decision was 
accepted in Ms B, indicating that ANH is outside the scope of the exception for 
competent patients also. In the case of Ms B, the applicant had suffered a ruptured 
blood vessel rendering her paralysed from the neck down and unable to breathe 
without the assistance of an artificial ventilator.
16
 With no hope of recovery, Ms B 
repeatedly requested the ventilation be removed. However, the medical professionals 
and care team, who had grown close to their patient, chose to ignore this wish. 
Consequently, Ms B applied for a court declaration regarding the lawfulness of the 
continued ventilation. The Court recognised the inherent tension between beneficence 
and autonomy in this case, i.e. the difficulties caused by the societal aim to keep 
people alive and issues this can raise when individuals make the choice to end life. 
However, the Court reiterated the principle that ―the right of the competent patient to 
request cessation of treatment must prevail over the natural desire of the medical 
profession to try to keep her alive‖.17 Butler-Sloss P. granted the declaration and held 
that the Trust had acted unlawfully in continuing to ventilate Ms B. 
                                               
13 This is implied through the Lords‘ lengthy discussion of whether artificial nutrition and hydration 
can properly be categorised as ‗medical treatment‘. It was suggested that if ANH could only be 
considered basic care, then withdrawal would not be permitted. See [1993] A.C. 789 at 819 per Butler-
Sloss LJ. 
14 Grubb 2004 at 141. 
15 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 870 per Lord Goff. 
16 Re B [2002] EWHC 429. 
17 Ibid at 27 per Butler-Sloss P. 
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The picture this paints of the current legal approach to medical treatment and 
end of life is one which recognises the importance of patient choice, further evidenced 
by the Court in Re T: 
 
The patient's interest consists of his right to self-determination - his right to live his 
own life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature 
death.
18
 
 
In sum, the law in this area evidences a strong desire to protect patient decisions 
regarding end of life. Although there are exceptions to this right of choice (a patient 
cannot refuse basic care) they are extremely narrow, applying only to care such as 
hygiene, pain relief and warmth. Moreover, when the Lords were faced with the 
opportunity to include tube feeding as basic care, they instead allowed this to move 
into the realm of what a person can lawfully refuse, further indicating the significance 
of autonomy at the end of life. The legal approach to contemporaneous refusals of 
life-sustaining medical treatment reinforces the message that recognition of an 
individual‘s right to choose death is paramount.  
 
2.3 Murder? 
 
However, the law in this area is not as straightforward as it first appears.  When a 
doctor switches off a ventilator pursuant to a patient‘s wish, knowing and perhaps 
intending such action will result in death, why is he not classified as a murderer? The 
actus reus of murder is an act (or omission amounting to a breach of duty), which 
results in the death of another and the mens rea is malice aforethought, intent to kill or 
cause serious bodily harm. Given that consent is not a defence to murder, how is it 
that the adherence to patient refusals is lawfully required and not considered a crime? 
The controversial answer to this question can be located in the judgments 
given in Bland.
19
 Although this case concerns an incompetent patient, it not only 
illustrates why a doctor can lawfully remove treatment from those who are 
incompetent, but also, why he may lawfully comply with a competent patient‘s refusal 
of life-prolonging medical treatment.  
                                               
18 Re T [1993] Fam. 95 at 100 per Ward J. 
19 Ibid. 
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In arriving at the decision that the removal of the tube providing the patient 
with artificial nutrition and hydration would be lawful, the Lords recognised that the 
medical professionals in this case did have the intent to end the life of the patient: 
 
As to the element of intention or mens rea, in my judgment there can be no real doubt 
that it is present in this case: the whole purpose of stopping artificial feeding is to 
bring about the death of Anthony Bland.
20
 
 
It is therefore clear that the mens rea of murder was satisfied in this case. A charge of 
murder did not arise, however, because the Lords held that the actus reus of the 
offence is lacking in a case of withholding or withdrawing treatment where there is no 
duty to act. The removal of the tube was held to be an omission and, as there was no 
longer a duty on behalf of the Trust to continue to treat Bland, this omission could not 
constitute the actus reus. Similarly, in cases where the patient is competent, there is no 
longer a duty to treat when the patient makes a refusal. Consequently, the withholding 
or withdrawing of life-prolonging treatment in these cases and in that of Bland, are 
considered lawful. 
 The judgment in Bland proved to be extremely controversial and a point of 
extensive academic discussion.
21
 The distinction made between the legality of an act 
and an omission has been particularly contentious, both conceptually and morally. It 
is significant that the Lords themselves recognised the issues with their reasoning, 
Lord Mustill concluded that the decision would leave the law ―morally and 
intellectually misshapen‖.22 Lord Browne-Wilkinson also adopted the distinction with 
unease: 
 
How can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, though painlessly, over a period 
of weeks from lack of food, but unlawful to produce his immediate death by a lethal 
injection, thereby saving his family from yet another ordeal to add to the tragedy that 
has already struck them? I find it difficult to find a moral answer to that question. But 
it is undoubtedly the law…23 
 
                                               
20 Ibid at 882 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
21 For example, Finnis 1993; McLachlan 2008. 
22 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 888. 
23 Ibid at 886. 
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This section will seek to assess the controversy surrounding the decision in Bland by 
questioning whether firstly, the Court correctly conceptualised a withdrawal as an 
omission, and secondly, whether the distinction the Court made between acts and 
omissions has any moral relevance. 
 
2.4 Conceptually Valid? 
 
The first issue raised by the distinction made between acts and omissions in Bland, is 
whether withdrawal of treatment is rightly classified as an omission. While most 
would agree that withholding treatment from a patient initially, for example, failing to 
perform a heart operation, is rightly categorised as an omission, withdrawal of 
treatment already being administered is much more contentious.  Many commentators 
have contended that withdrawing treatment, such as turning off a ventilator or 
removing a nasogastric tube, is in fact a state of action rather than inaction.
24
 In 
assessing this claim, the starting point must be the definition of an act itself and there 
are many descriptions provided in the literature: ―something done or performed‖,25 a 
―willed-muscular contraction‖26 or ―affirmative conduct‖.27 Although differing, all 
these suggestions indicate that physical movement is required. On this literal 
application, withdrawal of life-prolonging medical treatment is in fact an act, and any 
suggestion that it is an omission ―does some considerable damage to the ordinary 
English usage‖.28 
 However, as Harris notes, creating a strict boundary between what is an act 
and what is an omission is extremely problematic. He suggests that it is possible to 
reconceptualise anything as either an act or omission. He uses the illustration, ―I can 
for example shoot you or fail not to shoot you‖.29 In the same way, withdrawal of the 
feeding tube from Bland in this case could be seen as omitting to continue to 
administer ANH or acting to cessate such treatment. However, it is clear that 
withdrawal of treatment is in fact a physical intervention and as Pattinson notes, ―the 
situation is simply not one of inaction‖.30   
                                               
24 For a small sample of the debate see Elliot and Omerod 2008; McGee 2005; Williams 2008. 
25 Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus 2000 at 13. 
26 Moore 1993 at 78. 
27 Cantor 1987 at 32. 
28 Kennedy 1991 at 351. 
29 Harris 1985 at 29. 
30 Pattinson 2009 at 557. 
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 Further evidence that the withdrawal of treatment is wrongly classified as an 
omission stems from the Lords in Bland who acknowledge that the same conduct by 
an interloper (rather than the doctor in charge) would constitute an act. Lord Goff 
explains that, 
 
whereas the doctor, in discontinuing life support, is simply allowing his patient to die 
of his pre-existing condition, the interloper is actively intervening to stop the doctor 
from prolonging the patient's life, and such conduct cannot possibly be categorised as 
an omission.
31
 
 
Elliot and Omerod contend that to regard the same conduct as a lawful omission if 
committed by a medical practitioner and a murderous act if committed by another 
individual, ―is surely untenable‖.32 They rightly assert that withdrawals are in fact 
acts, regardless of who undertakes them.  
A final point of discussion cements the assertion that withdrawals were 
wrongly categorised in Bland. In the case of Ms B the medical professionals who had 
refused to remove the ventilator at their patient‘s request were not forced to remove 
her treatment – they could conscientiously object to doing so.33 Consequently, Ms B 
was transferred to a different hospital where the treatment was removed and she 
passed away. The question raised is this: if withdrawing the ventilation is an omission 
to act, how could the medical professionals object to failing to treat Ms B? The reality 
is that the doctors could not bring themselves to act to effectuate the end of Ms B‘s 
life, someone they had become extremely close to during the course of her treatment 
at the hospital. As Butler-Sloss P. noted, the clinicians could not ―bring themselves to 
contemplate that they should be part of bringing Ms B‘s life to an end by the dramatic 
step of turning off the ventilator‖.34 It is clear that medical professionals view 
withdrawal of treatment as an act, rather than an omission. 
It is evident on this analysis that the Court in Bland used the act/omission 
distinction to classify the withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging medical 
treatment as lawful. It is apparent that the withdrawal of treatment was wrongly held 
to be an omission, when in fact it involves a physical action. The question remains, 
                                               
31 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 867. 
32 Elliot and Omerod 2008 at 44. 
33 Re B [2002] EWHC 429. 
34 Ibid at [58] per Butler-Sloss P. 
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however (as it is accepted that the withholding of treatment is an omission) is there a 
morally relevant distinction between an act which brings about a patient‘s death and 
an omission which does the very same? 
 
2.5 Morally Valid? 
 
When applying the distinction between acts and omissions to the case of Bland, even 
the Lords themselves struggled to find a moral grounding. To reiterate the words of 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson:  
 
How can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, though painlessly, over a period 
of weeks from lack of food, but unlawful to produce his immediate death by a lethal 
injection, thereby saving his family from yet another ordeal to add to the tragedy that 
has already struck them? I find it difficult to find a moral answer to that question.
35
 
 
The example given in this extract is particularly compelling given that both situations 
produce the same result – death. Surely the quick, pain-free option is morally 
preferable to allowing the patient to slowly starve, yet this is completely antithetical to 
the current legal situation we face. Nevertheless, some academics revere the 
act/omission distinction as one which is built on sturdy moral foundations.   
 The most common argument in defence of the distinction is that an act is an 
interference with the normal course of nature, whereas an omission merely allows 
nature to take its course.
36
 McGee, a proponent of the argument from nature, explains 
the moral difference: 
 
What is proposed in euthanasia is that we wrest from nature control of our ultimate 
fate: we decide when and how we should die, and we ensure thereby that we have the 
last word. In lawful withdrawal, by contrast, the very opposite is the case: we 
interfere with nature, not in killing the patient but in keeping the patient alive, and the 
question of whether or not we should withdraw treatment is at the bottom of the 
question of whether we should restore to nature her dominion, allowing nature finally 
to take its course, with the patient dying a natural death.
37
 
                                               
35 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 886. 
36 See Kass and Lund 1996; McGee 2005. 
37 McGee 2005 at 383. 
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In application, let us imagine Jane, who is suffering from cancer. The disease has 
spread through the entirety of her body and is causing her agonising pain, leaving her 
unable to sleep, eat (without the assistance of a nasogastric tube), or enjoy the 
smallest activity. On McGee‘s analysis, administering a lethal injection to Jane, on 
her request, would be an interference with nature and morally wrong. If, on the other 
hand, doctors removed the nasogastric tube being used to administer ANH to Jane on 
her request and she slowly died of starvation and dehydration, this would be morally 
acceptable as the doctors were allowing nature to take its course. Of course such an 
analysis appears absurd, because although McGee suggests that ‗interfering with 
nature‘ is morally undesirable, he fails to explain why, quite possibly because any 
attempt to do so would be virtually impossible. If this were the case, keeping Jane 
alive with ANH to begin with would be immoral, treating an infection with antibiotics 
would be immoral, flood defences in place to prevent a natural disaster would be 
immoral and sending aid packages to countries suffering from drought would be 
immoral. The reality, as highlighted by Harris, is that, 
 
There is undoubtedly a widespread, but equally undoubtedly irrational respect for 
what is natural or part of the course of nature. Famines, floods droughts and storms 
are all natural and all disastrous. We only, and rightly, want the natural when it is 
good for us. What is natural is morally inert and progress-dependent. It was only 
natural for people to die of infected wounds before antibiotics were available….38 
 
There is a second criticism of the argument from nature. McGee explains that what 
distinguishes euthanasia from withdrawal of treatment is that in the former we ―wrest 
from nature control of our fate‖ and ―have the last word‖.39 However, in requesting 
the removal of a tube which she knows is sustaining her life, surely Jane is doing 
exactly that – taking control and deciding the time of her death. It is a fallacy to say 
that it was ‗nature‘ which ended her life, when Jane could potentially live for months, 
possibly years longer with the medical treatment. In reality, it was Jane‘s decision to 
request the intervention that ended her life, she had ―the last word‖.  
                                               
38 Harris 1985 at 38. 
39 McGee 2005 at 383. 
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 Kass and Lund suggest that this analysis is incorrect and that it is nature which 
ends life in these cases, evidenced by the fact that patients who request withdrawals 
do not always die as a result.
40
 They use the case of Karen Ann Quinlan who 
continued to live for ten years after the removal of her respirator, in claiming ―the 
right to discontinue treatment cannot be part of some larger right to ‗determine the 
time and manner of one‘s own death‘‖.41 However, this argument is unconvincing. 
This occurrence is extremely rare and in almost all cases, such as removal of ANH or 
ventilation, the patient believes that their life will end as a result. What is more, 
whether or not Quinlan‘s case is extremely rare, the possibility that a suicide attempt 
will fail exists even where the attempt is unequivocally an act. For example, when an 
able-bodied person takes what they believe to be a lethal dose of paracetamol in order 
to end their life, the chance that such an attempt will fail exists and is higher, I would 
suggest, than the chance of failure where a request is made to remove an artificial 
ventilation system. In taking life without any medical assistance, individuals arguable 
face a greater risk of a ‗botched suicide‘, hence why there exists a range of books, 
websites and leaflets which aim to help people commit suicide successfully.
42
 Thus, 
the possibility of survival after a suicide attempt cannot, as Kass and Lund suggest, 
mark a moral difference between acts and omissions.   
 This leads us to a second explanation of the moral distinction between acts and 
omissions. Stauch claims that an omission is morally different to an act because it 
cannot have causative impact.
43
 He suggests that, without a duty to act, an omission 
cannot be a crime because there is no ―authorship‖ over the result, the individual 
cannot be said to be responsible for the outcome. The moral relevance of this 
distinction for end of life is that where a person acts to bring about the death of 
another, he assumes authorship of that death, and in turn, breaches the equality 
principle. According to this principle, ―the life of each individual has an equal claim 
to a minimum respect possessing irreducible value‖, and thus, by actively ending the 
life of another, a person fails to show this respect for human life.
44
 He uses the 
example from Brock‘s work of a patient dying from terminal cancer, who has 
                                               
40 Kass and Lund 1996 at 420. 
41Ibid at 420. 
42 For example see James 2010 and Miller, Vandome and McBrewster 2011.  
43 Stauch 2000. 
44 Ibid at 240. 
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indicated his desire to have his life ended.
45
 There are two outcomes, in the first the 
man‘s wife uses a pillow to suffocate him while he sleeps. In the second, the man 
develops breathing difficulties which require immediate medical attention, but the 
wife fails to alert the medical staff and her husband consequently dies. According to 
Stauch, the moral difference between the two outcomes is ―simply that in the first 
instance, by assuming authorship over the man‘s death, she infringes the equality 
principle. In the second instance she does not‖.46 
 Unfortunately Stauch‘s analysis ends there. He fails to demonstrate why there 
can be no authorship in the second situation, simply claiming that the wife can have 
no causative impact on the death of her husband in failing to alert the doctor of his 
breathing difficulty. However, this suggestion is ridiculous. If the wife had sought 
medical assistance, her husband would have lived. Applying the most basic legal rules 
of causation, ‗but for‘ the wife‘s omission, the man would be alive. It is absurd to 
suggest that an omission cannot have causative impact, simply because it is an 
omission. If, due to indolence, I omit to write a thesis before the given deadline and 
fail my degree, I have caused my failure. I am just as much a cause as if I had 
submitted a terrible piece that could not possibly have been successful. Stauch may 
well reply that I would have a causative impact in this case, because I had a duty to 
complete my work. However, the factual link between the omission and the end result 
remains valid, regardless of any duty on my part. To suggest otherwise manipulates 
the common understanding of ‗cause‘ in order to frame an omission as morally 
preferable to an act which produces the exact same result.  
The above analysis reveals that the act/omission distinction is not coterminous 
with moral responsibility. Simply because something is classified as ―an act‖, does 
not make it more morally culpable than something classified as ―an omission‖. It is a 
fact that every action and inaction has a consequence. If I choose to hit my boss, the 
consequence is likely to be the termination of my employment. If I choose to ignore 
my mother‘s phone calls, the consequence is likely to be damage to our relationship. 
Everything a person chooses to do or not to do has an impact on the world, however 
small. What is more, the consequences which arise from omissions can be just as vital 
and important as those that arise from acts. I gave the example of omitting to 
complete my thesis on time, Professor Harris gives the example of a doctor who fails 
                                               
45 Brock 1993 at 187-188. 
46 Stauch 2000 at 241. 
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to administer glucose to a patient in a hypoglycaemic coma, but the principle is the 
same: omissions have consequences and those who fail to do something can be 
responsible for those outcomes.
47
  
Moreover, the way in which we make this impression is irrelevant, rather, it is 
the impression itself that is morally important. Again Harris maintains the same 
position. He terms acts as ―positive responsibility‖ and omissions as ―negative 
responsibility‖, and uses these to show that, 
 
if the occurrence of a particular event or state of affairs would be a disaster it makes 
no moral difference whether our responsibility for that disaster is positive or 
negative.
48
 
 
So (using a particularly emotive example given by Rachels)
49
 imagine you are in a 
room with a starving and skeletal child with a sandwich that you do not need and you 
omit to give the sandwich to the child, who subsequently dies; it is clear that you are 
just as morally culpable as a person who kills the child through an act. Although it is 
not a positive act, withholding the food would undoubtedly be classified as ―morally 
monstrous‖.50 This shows that an omission can be just as morally abhorrent as an act.  
 Taking Harris‘ example, children born with severe spina bifida face an 
extremely poor quality of life and as a result, many doctors offer selective treatment 
to the families of such babies.
51
 Selective treatment is a programme of non-treatments 
which are intended to result in death. The doctors may choose from a range of non-
treatment such as non-feeding, non-treatment of infection or non-ventilation if the 
baby develops breathing difficulties. Consequently, the family will be forced to watch 
the baby dying slowly over a number of weeks. The question is this: how is selective 
treatment of babies with spina bifida morally preferable to a quick and painless death? 
In this instance, surely the better course of action would be to end the life of the baby 
swiftly and avoid the agonising heartache of a drawn out death for family members. It 
is clear that in some cases, actions which bring about death can be morally preferable 
to omissions which have the very same outcome. 
                                               
47 Harris 1985 at 32. 
48 Ibid at 30. 
49 Rachels 1979 at 160. 
50 Using the parlance from Rachels 1979 at 160. 
51 Harris 1985 at 33-45. 
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 However, it is a common counter argument that whether something is an act or 
an omission does have an impact morally. It can be argued that in many instances, an 
omission is less morally culpable that an act, because it is an omission. This is 
because, in those cases where a person omits to do something, there would be costs or 
risks involved in acting. For example, imagine you push a person into an electric 
fence, resulting in their death. It is reasonable to assert that had the person already 
become entangled in the fence, and was being electrocuted, your omission to attempt 
to free them from the wires would be much less morally abhorrent than pushing them. 
The risk of you also becoming a victim of the fence would be too great and the cost of 
helping the person could be your life. In this instance, there is a moral difference 
between the two scenarios which exists because the latter is an omission. This 
establishes that there can be different moral considerations which are applicable to 
omissions and not to acts, these considerations being cost and risk.  
However, it is suggested that such costs and risks were not relevant in the 
discussion surrounding Bland, and are not relevant to the debate regarding the 
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining medical treatment. In Bland, there 
would be no disproportionate physical risk to the doctor in acting to bring about the 
death of Tony Bland, as oppose to removing his feeding tube. Similarly, if assisted 
suicide were legalised, there would not be a disproportionate risk to the doctor in 
actively ending the life of a patient that would exist should they omit to treat in order 
to end life. In this situation, whether the doctor acts or omits to act is not morally 
relevant, as there are no different risks or costs to the doctor in each situation.  
It has been established that the Lords were right to feel uneasy in applying the 
act/omission distinction in Bland, owing to both its conceptual uncertainty and the 
absence of any moral justification in this instance. Administering a lethal injection to 
Tony Bland would have resulted in the very same outcome as removing the feeding 
tube, and in fact, the former is the morally preferable route, as it would have been the 
quicker option, the latter involving a slow death through starvation.  
It is suggested that the reason why the Lords in Bland adopted a distinction 
they could neither defend nor explain was to achieve a particular aim. Although the 
Lords were not directly dealing with the issue of suicide, in establishing this legal 
fiction through interpreting the doctor‘s conduct as an omission, they were able to 
effectively deem this form of assistance with ending life legal. Williams also 
acknowledges that ―interpreting the doctor‘s conduct as an omission to treat is a 
20 
 
 
 
useful fiction used by the courts to absolve medical professionals from criminal 
liability‖.52 The problem this judicial step has created is that, as it has been established 
that there is no moral difference between an act and an omission in this instance, 
logically there is no reason why helping a person to end their own life through a 
positive act should not be considered lawful. Indeed, the law has been left ―morally 
and intellectually misshapen‖ by the judiciary‘s attempt to become more permissive 
regarding end of life conduct.
53
 The imposition of an arbitrary distinction has created 
legal inconsistency: the law recognises the importance of the ability to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, but in instances where such an individual does not have need of 
such treatment, the distinction between acts and omissions prohibits the very same 
exercise of choice it so valiantly defends.  
 
2.6 Summary 
 
Analysis of just one area of legal regulation has already unearthed inconsistencies. 
The law not only permits, but requires that a doctor act upon a patient‘s decision to 
refuse medical treatment which is keeping them alive, effectively compelling a doctor 
to assist in death.
54
 However, where the situation is that a person no longer wishes to 
live, but is not being kept alive by medical treatment, a doctor is prohibited from 
assisting them directly. The difference? Removing life-sustaining treatment is 
classified as an omission and directly assisting in death is an act. Two people who 
desire the same outcome - assistance in death – are treated differently because of a 
distinction which I have established, in this situation, holds no moral or logical 
weight. Already the tensions in the legal approach to end of life are revealing 
themselves. It is useful to end this chapter with a hypothetical example in order to 
highlight the unfairness created by the law.  
 Tom is a long-distance lorry driver and has unfortunately been involved in a 
terrible motorway accident. As a result Tom has been left paralysed from the neck 
down and in need of round-the-clock care. While Tom remains intellectually 
unscathed and retains the ability to swallow food, he is unable to breathe unaided and 
has been attached to an artificial ventilation system.  After three weeks of continual 
                                               
52 Williams 2008 at 94. 
53 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 887 per Lord Mustill. 
54 Or to conscientiously object and transfer the patient to another doctor as was the case in Re B (Adult: 
Refusal of Medical treatment) [2002] EWHC 429.  
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care at the hospital, Tom expresses that he no longer wishes to live. With little close 
family, driving is Tom‘s passion, and thus, he feels that facing a life without such 
pleasure would be worthless. Consequently, Tom requests that in three days time, 
after he has had chance to say goodbye to the family he does have, doctors detach the 
ventilation system keeping him alive. The doctors agree, as they are legally bound to 
comply with such a refusal. Tom‘s decision to die is legally respected. However, in an 
unusual turn of events, on the second day before the treatment was due to be removed, 
Tom regains the ability to breathe unassisted and no longer requires the ventilator. 
Tom still wishes to end his life and he asks the doctor of his options. He is informed 
that there is nothing now that the doctor can do to help him. Placing a lethal pill on his 
tongue would amount to an offence under s.2 Suicide Act 1961 and directly taking 
Tom‘s life would render the doctor liable for murder. Tom‘s decision to die is no 
longer protected, a mere medical technicality standing between him and respect for 
his autonomy. Is it fair that the need for artificial ventilation be the deciding factor in 
whether Tom can lawfully end his life? 
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3.  
ARBITRARY DISTINCTION TWO: 
PALLIATIVE CARE vs NO PALLIATIVE CARE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
If we recall the hypothetical story from the introduction to this thesis, we will 
remember Candice. Candice suffered from terminal bone cancer and eventually made 
the decision to end her life. Consequently, she requested that her doctor administer a 
lethal dose of a palliative drug, which resulted in her death. You were asked to 
imagine that you are a sufferer of Motor Neurone disease. As you are paralysed from 
the neck down with only months to live, you wish to end your life but cannot make 
that same choice. Your pain is mental, rather than physical, and thus, you do not 
require palliative care. How is it fair that Candice can legally choose to end her 
suffering, but you, simply because of circumstance, must suffer until the very end 
against your will? This chapter seeks to explore the justifications given as to why 
those in Candice‘s situation can make the choice to end their life, but others may not. 
Can such reasoning withstand critical analysis? If not, we face an extremely unfair 
legal position which permits certain categories of people to make the choice to end 
life, but arbitrarily prohibits others. 
It has been established in the preceding chapter that a doctor may lawfully 
remove life-sustaining medical treatment, but may not directly take the life of a 
patient, for example, through administration of a lethal dose of medication. This 
section engages in a deeper analysis of this prohibition and reveals that it is not as 
absolute as it may first appear. There are, in fact, some instances where a doctor may 
lawfully inject a patient with a fatal dose of drugs. So then, what is the distinction 
between the acceptable practices and the unacceptable, and moreover, is this 
differentiation justifiable or just another arbitrary legal imposition? 
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3.2 The Legal Position 
 
Any person who intentionally takes the life of another innocent human being commits 
murder.
55
 Consequently, if a doctor assists a patient who is unable to take their own 
life, by injecting them with a lethal substance, he has committed the crime of murder 
and potentially faces a mandatory life sentence. The injection constitutes the actus 
reus (an act which results in the death of another) and the doctor‘s intention to bring 
about the death, forms the mens rea (intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm).  
 Despite how unambiguously the doctor‘s conduct falls under this offence, it is 
rare for a murder charge to actually arise. In the few instances where a charge has 
been brought, there is considerable judicial reluctance to punish a doctor who acts out 
of compassion. In R v Cox a doctor administered a lethal dose of potassium chloride 
to an elderly patient who had repeatedly begged him to end her life.
56
 As the body had 
been cremated, it could not be assessed whether the chemical had been the cause of 
her death, and thus, the doctor was charged and convicted of attempted murder as 
opposed to murder. In this case, Dr Cox received a minimal twelve-month suspended 
prison sentence and was even allowed to continue practising, provided he work under 
supervision and attend additional training courses. The apparent judicial sympathy for 
the doctor in this case suggests that instances in which a doctor complies 
compassionately with a patient‘s request are distinct from those where a killer 
maliciously shoots his victim through the skull. 
 The question is then raised: how can a doctor‘s behaviour be justified where 
there is evident causation between his act and the death of the patient? In R v Adams, 
the doctor administered lethal doses of morphine and heroin to his elderly patient (of 
whose will he was a beneficiary).
57
 Dr Adams was subsequently charged with her 
murder. However, the jury swiftly acquitted Dr Adams, having been directed in 
accordance with the controversial doctrine of double effect.
58
 This principle explains 
that an act which has both a positive and a negative outcome may be permissible 
providing that the intention is to achieve the positive outcome and the negative is an 
unavoidable side effect. In R v Adams, the intended positive result was pain relief and 
                                               
55 Murder is a common law offence whereby an individual kills another innocent human being with 
intent to cause serious injury or death (originally termed ‗malice aforethought‘). 
56 R v Cox (1992) 12 B.M.L.R. 38.  
57 R v Adams [1957] Criminal Law Review 365. 
58 Ibid. 
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the negative unavoidable side effect was the death of the elderly patient. Accordingly, 
Devlin J. justified the acquittal on the grounds that a medical professional may ―do all 
that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures taken 
may incidentally shorten human life‖.59   
 Thirty-five years later, the case of Annie Lindsell reaffirmed the lawfulness of 
the administration of life-shortening drugs for palliative care.
60
 Ms Lindsell was a 
sufferer of the progressive neurological disease, Motor Neurone disease. She 
subsequently sought a court declaration to ensure that when she lost the ability to 
swallow, and could no longer face the terrible prospect of further deterioration, it 
would be lawful for her doctor to administer a lethal dose of diamorphine to ease her 
pain. The Court heard how ―English law (and in particular, the English law of murder) 
undoubtedly recognises and gives effect to the doctrine of double effect‖ and, as the 
life shortening aspect of the drug was a mere side effect of the pain relief, the case 
was discontinued.
61
 The judge stated that he ―thoroughly approved and endorsed the 
discontinuance‖ of Ms Lindsell‘s case.62 
 The following case of Dr Moor further entrenched the doctrine of double 
effect into criminal law. Dr Moor was convicted of murder after administering a lethal 
dose of diamorphine to an elderly male cancer patient. However, in court, Hooper J 
spoke favourably of the accused, describing him as ―a man of excellent character‖ 
who has ―many admirable qualities‖, persuading the jury to reach a unanimous verdict 
of acquittal in less than one hour.
63
 
 
3.3 Morally Valid? 
 
The question is this: is the doctrine of double effect a morally justifiable distinction? 
Does the doctor who administers a fatal dose of potassium chloride with the intent of 
ending the patient‘s life, do something more morally abhorrent than the doctor who 
uses heroin to relieve pain in the knowledge that death will be a virtually certain 
result? Keown strongly asserts that there is a moral difference between these two 
courses of action, as the former doctor intends death and the latter intends palliative 
                                               
59 R v Adams [1957] Criminal Law Review 365 at 375. 
60 Ann Lindsell v Simon Holmes  unreported, see Keown 2002 at 22-25. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid at 24. 
63 Unreported, see Dyer 1999. 
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effects.
64
 He uses the example of two dentists: Mr Fill and Mr Drill. A patient with a 
decaying tooth visits Mr Fill, who then drills a hole in the tooth and closes it with a 
filling. Another patient, with an identical ailment, visits Mr Drill who also drills a 
hole in the tooth and closes it with a filling. In both cases, Keown highlights, the 
dentists have repaired the decaying tooth, but the moral difference lies in the 
intention. Mr Fill‘s direct intent was to repair the tooth and the pain suffered was an 
unavoidable side effect of this. However, for the cruel Mr Drill, his primary intention 
was to cause pain, and the therapeutic benefits were a mere side effect. Keown 
explains ―[c]learly, whereas Mr Fill has done nothing morally questionable, Mr Drill 
has. And the reason is solely to be found in Mr Drill‘s intending the bad 
consequence‖.65  
 The most obvious response to such an argument is that the outcome in both 
cases is identical. Both patients have their tooth repaired regardless of their dentist‘s 
intention. Harris agrees, claiming that where the consequences are identical, the 
distinction between a direct effect and a side effect is ―without moral significance‖.66 
Harris reuses the example employed by the Linacre Centre of a potholer who is stuck 
underground with people trapped behind him.
67
 In the cave the water is rising rapidly 
and the group will all drown unless one of two actions are taken: the potholer can be 
blown up, or a rock can be moved to create an escape route but this will consequently 
crush the potholer. The Linacre Centre hold that those people who would choose to 
move the rock rather than blow up the man do so because they are people who ―will 
absolutely reject a policy making the death of innocent people a means or an end‖.68 
However, Harris describes this as an example of ―the most comprehensive 
sophistry‖.69 Actions are indefinitely expandable, and thus, to exclude all other 
consequences that are not the direct intention of the action is ridiculous. To Harris, 
what is relevant is not whether our actions are direct or indirect, but how they affect 
the world around us.  
 Keown may well respond that the consequences of actions are irrelevant if the 
means employed are immoral, but I suggest that his explanation of the moral 
                                               
64  Keown 2002 at 18-30. 
65 Ibid at 19. 
66 Harris 1985 at 44. 
67 The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics is a Roman Catholic association that engages in the ethical 
and legal debates surrounding modern medicine.  
68 The Linacre Centre 1982 at 34-35. 
69 Harris 1985 at 44. 
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significance of double effect is flawed nonetheless. Keown‘s argument is based on an 
assumption which is neither discussed, nor rationally justified. Keown bases his 
discussion on the assertion that intending to kill another human being is always 
morally repugnant. If it is not (the view I wish to support) then surely it is irrelevant 
as to whether a patient‘s life is ended by direct or indirect means. The idea that the 
intentional death of another is always wrong is embedded in the sanctity of life 
principle (a position held by Keown himself analysed in depth in Chapter Five). The 
difficulty arises when this viewpoint can no longer be defended. Given the decline of 
established religion in the UK, there is substantially less support for the belief that 
human life is valuable in and of itself, and greater support for idea that it is the right to 
shape one‘s life which makes it so precious.70 Moreover, given that in this medically 
advanced era people are living longer with a range of debilitating illnesses, more and 
more people are adopting the view that it is not always morally wrong to intervene to 
deliberately end a life prematurely.
71
 In fact, 80% of people in the UK support a 
change in the current law prohibiting assisted dying, evidencing the growing ideology 
that intending the death of another is not always immoral.
72
 Moreover, in recent years 
the UK has seen a number of bills and amendments before Parliament seeking to 
implement such a change and there has been a significant rise in the number of 
pressure and lobby groups who aim to stimulate the legalisation of assisted death.
73
 
Consequently, Keown‘s defence of the doctrine of double effect relies on the belief 
that life is valuable in itself as it is God-given or simply because it is human life. 
 The view that the doctrine of double effect lacks moral justification seems to 
be mirrored in the case of R v Woollin where it was held that knowledge of a virtually 
certain consequence could be used by a jury to infer intention.
74
 The Court in this case 
appears to have conflated the notions of intention and foresight, indicating the lack of 
judicial belief in any moral distinction. The difficulty being, that both intention and 
                                               
70 See BBC News (2000) ‗UK is ‗losing‘ its Religion‘ available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1043986.stm <Accessed 13/01/2012>. 
71 It must be noted that while public opinion of what is morally acceptable is influential in this debate, 
particularly regarding faith, the mere existence of that opinion is not persuasive without further 
justification explanation. The law should not, and does not, always mirror public opinion, as is the case 
with the death penalty for example. See Cafe, Rebecca (4 August 2011). "Does the public want the 
death penalty brought back?". BBC News (BBC) <accessed 7/08/2011>. 
72 See Dignity In Dying campaign. Their extensive website is located at 
http://www.dignityindying.org.uk/ <accessed 12/12/2010>.  
73 Again see Dignity in Dying and their ever-increasing member-base. However, it should be noted that 
the DPP nevertheless made the decision not to change the law in this area, evidenced by the 
prosecutorial guidelines see Crown Prosecution Service (2010). 
74 [1999] 1 A.C. 82. 
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foresight are now both equally legally culpable. In application to the medical arena, 
Woollin casts doubt ―on the lawfulness of palliative care which doctors foresee will 
shorten life‖.75 It is not possible that such foresight could be used to infer intention 
and doctors, who end patients‘ lives through administering fatal doses of palliative 
drugs, could now potentially face a murder charge. Woollin evidences that in the eyes 
of the law, intention and foresight are equally morally culpable with regard to taking 
the life of another. Unfortunately, it is suggested that the Court in this case failed to 
consider the effect on the medical profession, meaning that a doctor, due to fear of 
prosecution, may now be unwilling to assist in a patient‘s death through any fatal dose 
of drugs, palliative or otherwise.  
 In Re A, the Court was given the opportunity to attempt to reconcile the case 
of Woolin with the doctrine of double effect.
76
 In this case, the Court was faced with 
the difficult question of whether the doctors could lawfully operate to separate 
conjoined twins, in the knowledge that one baby would die as a result. In ruling that 
the operation would be lawful, the majority felt that the doctrine of double effect did 
not apply in the circumstances, and instead the doctrine of necessity should be applied 
to defend the doctors‘ actions.77 In doing so, the Court was able to avoid tackling the 
difficult question of whether the doctrine of double effect is compatible with the 
decision in Woolin, and instead, as Pattinson suggests, ―knocks the problem of 
explaining why palliative care is not unlawful onto another aspect of the law of 
murder‖.78 It appears then, that Re A does little to reconcile Woolin with the doctrine, 
merely suggesting that in future the doctrine of necessity may be used to protect 
doctors from murder charges. It is still currently unclear as to how, if at all, Woollin 
will affect medical law and until this is confirmed the artificial distinction between 
intent and foresight is one which remains. 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
On closer inspection of the law prohibiting a doctor‘s direct taking of life, it is evident 
that there are some instances where such behaviour is permitted – where the drugs 
                                               
75 Keown 2002 at 27. 
76 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147. 
77 Robert Walker L.J. did feel that a distinction could be made between intent and foresight in the facts.  
See [2001] Fam. 147 at 259.  
78 Pattinson 2009 at 525. 
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have a palliative effect. The justification provided by the law is the doctrine of double 
effect: a doctor may not intend a patient‘s death, but he may intend pain relief 
whereby death is an unintended side effect. Analysis of the intention-foresight 
distinction has revealed that it is based upon the idea that the intentional taking of 
innocent human life is always morally wrong, a sanctity of life based position. 
However, this position assumes that all human life is valuable in itself, as all life has 
an inherent sanctity or value. The difficulty arises (as explored in greater depth in Part 
2) where people do not value life simply because it is human life, but because of the 
ability we have to change and shape our own lives and furthermore, where the law 
directly contradicts the claim that human life is inherently valuable.
79
 Thus, this fails 
to justify the distinction between intent and foresight, and consequently, the law 
imposes another arbitrary distinction on the regulation of end of life practices. To 
explicate the unfairness such a position causes, it is again useful to turn to a 
hypothetical example.  
 Imagine two sisters, Lara and Clara, both of whom are suffering from equally 
devastating conditions. Lara has terminal cancer and after over two years of intensive 
treatment, has decided that her pain is too much to bear. With only months to live, 
Lara makes the decision to bring her life to a premature and dignified end. She 
requests that her doctor administer a fatal dose of morphine, a palliative drug, which 
will result in her death. The doctor complies with her wish and providing he does not 
intend her death (only the pain relief) and assuming Woollin has no effect on the 
medical profession, he acts lawfully. Consequently, Lara dies with her closest family 
by her side. Clara was involved in a tragic accident where she fell down three flights 
of concrete steps. After the accident Clara was left paralysed from the neck 
downwards. Although she feels no physical pain, Clara‘s pain is emotional and 
psychological and she too wishes to end her life. However, if a doctor were to assist in 
her death through the administration of a fatal dose of drugs, his actions would be 
unlawful as his primary intent would not be palliative care. Consequently, no doctor 
will agree to assist her and Clara is forced to continue living against her will. Is it fair 
that the need for palliative care be a determining factor in whether one can lawfully 
end life? 
 
                                               
79 See Chapter Five.  
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4.  
ARBITRARY DISTINCTION THREE: 
ABLE-BODIED vs. DISABLED 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Let us, again, return to the hypothetical story mapped out in the introduction to this 
thesis, and in particular, Alice. Alice lost her husband and three children in a car 
accident and subsequently discovered she was left with £200 000 of debt. Thus, Alice 
took a lethal dose of paracetamol and ended her life. You will remember that I asked 
you to imagine you are a sufferer of Motor Neurone disease. Given that you are 
paralysed from the neck down with only months to live, you wish to end your life, but 
cannot make that same choice. You have no life-sustaining treatment to refuse and 
nobody can legally assist you. How is it fair that Alice can legally choose to end her 
suffering, but you, simply because of circumstance, must suffer until the very end 
against your will? This chapter seeks to explore the justifications given as to why 
those in Alice‘s situation can make the choice to end their life, but others cannot. Can 
such reasoning withstand critical analysis? If not, we face an extremely unfair legal 
position which permits certain categories of people to make the choice to end life, but 
arbitrarily prohibits others. 
The preceding chapters have established that a doctor may lawfully remove 
life-sustaining medical treatment from a patient, or inject them with a fatal dose of 
palliative medication with the effect of ending life, but where medication is not 
palliative or the patient does not require medical treatment to keep them alive, 
assistance is prohibited by s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961. What is more, the law 
essentially permits the suicide of an able-bodied person through s.1 of the same Act, 
yet prohibits an individual to ―assist or encourage‖ the suicide or attempted suicide of 
another, meaning a decision to end life is afforded less protection to persons who are 
disabled. It is undoubtedly unfair that the law treats the same decision so differently: 
where a person is able-bodied their choice is permitted, yet where a person is 
physically or mentally disabled, they face a legal barrier. Again, this chapter seeks to 
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grapple with the current law in order to ascertain whether this unjust position can be 
defended, or whether we have encountered yet another arbitrary distinction.  
 
4.2 The Legal Position 
 
4.2.1 Suicide 
 
Historically, the development of the Christian religion had a significant impact on 
attitudes towards end of life, including suicide. With an initial opposition to all forms 
of killing, which developed into the rejection of all intentional killing of innocent 
human beings, the Christian approach is essentially proscriptive.
80
 The justification 
behind such a ban is that God is the supreme giver and remover of life, and thus, any 
attempt to terminate life prematurely is an insult to His power. Consequently, 
committing suicide was strictly forbidden and the religious rejection of such practices 
was reflected in the law: 
 
(T)he law of England wisely and religiously considers that no man hath a power to 
destroy life but by commission from God - the author of it. And as suicide is guilty of 
a double offence: one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty and 
rushing into His immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal, against the 
King who hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects. The law has therefore 
ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of felony, a felony 
committed on one's self....
81
 
 
The law held that a person who unsuccessfully attempted to take their own life would 
be guilty of an offence. Although those who were successful could not be directly 
punished, they would however, be subject to a public and degrading burial and the 
family of the deceased would indirectly suffer, as all goods and land would be 
forfeited to the king. Such a law was an attempt to dissuade the general public from 
―so desperate and wicked an act‖ as suicide.82 
However, in 1961 suicide was eventually decriminalised by s.1 of Suicide Act, 
which states, ―The rule of law whereby it is a crime for a person to commit suicide is 
                                               
80 See Rachels 1986. 
81 Blackstone 1775 at vol. IV. 
82 Blackstone 1832 at vol. II. 
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hereby abrogated‖. Although it may seem that such a legislative move was undertaken 
in order to show respect for individual choice regarding the end of life, careful 
analysis of parliamentary debates indicates that the purpose of the Act was, in fact, the 
opposite: ―to help the suicidal not to commit suicide by enabling them to avoid the 
stigma of the crime…‖ and not to in any way encourage suicide.83 This intent is 
evidenced in Hansard Reports where it was explained that decriminalisation ―in no 
way lessens, nor should it lessen, the respect for the sanctity of human life which we 
all share‖84 and that ―suicide will still remain a mortal sin‖.85 
Keown agrees, adding that although suicide has been decriminalised, it 
remains unlawful.
86
 However, while it is accepted that the Act was not an 
endorsement of any self-destructive behaviour, Keown‘s assertion is a contradiction 
in terms. The very fact that suicide was ―decriminalised‖ evidences that it is no longer 
unlawful (with the absence of any civil wrong). For a practice to be considered 
unlawful, surely either a civil or criminal standard must be breached. On this widely 
accepted definition, suicide is not unlawful. There can be no legal repercussions for 
committing or attempting to commit suicide. Despite the Parliamentary intention 
when drafting s.1 of the Suicide Act, the effect of this provision is that a person may 
now take their own life prematurely, in the knowledge that there will be no legal 
ramifications. Notwithstanding the claims that suicide remains undesirable, the reality 
is that the law permits the self-destruction of any capable person.  
 
4.2.2 Assisted Suicide 
 
Section 1 of the Suicide Act 1961 decriminalised the act of suicide, however, assisting 
another to take their own life remains unlawful. Prior to the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009, s.2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 prohibited behaviour which ―aids, abets, 
counsels or procures the suicide of another‖. Given the ambiguous nature of these 
terms, the judiciary attempted to define the scope of the offence and in doing so, 
severely restricted it.
87
 Consequently, Parliament has amended the Act in an attempt 
to make clearer the type of conduct prohibited, without making a change to the 
                                               
83 Lord Brennan (when debating the legal requirements of an advance decision of Mental Capacity Bill) 
HL Deb 27 January 2005 vol 668 cols 443-512. 
84 Mr Charles Fletcher-Cooke MP (1960-1) 645 Parl. Deb., HC, cols. 822-3. 
85 Mr Eric Fletcher HC Deb 28 July 1961 vol 645 cols 824-825. 
86 Keown 1995 at 65. 
87 Attorney-General v Able and Others [1984] Q.B. 795.; R v Chard (1993) The Times 23 September. 
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substantive law.
88
 Section 2 of the Act, as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009, now states: 
 
(1) A person (―D‖) commits an offence if— 
(a) D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted 
suicide of another person, and 
(b) D's act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at 
suicide. 
 
Section 2A, entitled ―Acts capable of encouraging or assisting‖, seeks to indicate the 
types of action that will fall under this offence. ―Threatening another person‖ and 
―putting pressure on another person‖ are included, and s.2B explains that it need not 
be a single act; a course of conduct can also constitute an offence. The explanatory 
notes to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 give the example of an author of a website 
promoting suicide, intending to assist or encourage others to commit suicide.
89
 The 
notes explain that that she would be guilty of assisted suicide even if she does not 
know the readers and even where suicide does not actually take place. Moreover, the 
notes explain that a person is guilty of the offence if she intends to encourage or 
assist, even where the facts are not as she believes them to be.
90
 For example, 
supplying pills she believes to be lethal which, in fact, are not. Beyond this 
information, however, the Act provides no further information regarding conduct that 
will fall under this offence. Given the potentially ever-expanding category of liability, 
this has proven problematic. Is accompanying a loved one to Switzerland to end their 
life an ―act capable of encouraging or assisting‖ suicide? Does the taxi driver, who in 
full knowledge of the nature of the trip, drives the couple to the airport, also commit 
this offence? Could the family friend who helps to load the suitcases into the boot of 
the car be acting unlawfully? Although these people do not automatically commit the 
offence (they must also intend to encourage or assist in the suicide of that person), the 
line between permissible and impermissible behaviour is far from clear.  Evidently the 
provisions set out by the Suicide Act 1961 as amended, do little to remedy the 
definitional issues pre-2009. What is more, to further complicate the question of what 
                                               
88 Hansard HL col. 631 (7th July 2009) per Lord Bach. 
89 Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/notes/contents <accessed 13/07/2011> at 
[357]. 
90 Ibid at [359]. 
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conduct constitutes ―assisting suicide‖, the Director of Public Prosecutions (hereafter 
DPP) must consent to the institution of any proceedings under this offence.
91
 
 
4.3 Can the Prohibition of Assisted Suicide be Justified? 
  
Despite the difficulty in determining the precise conduct the Act is aimed at, the legal 
position is clear in its prohibition of assisting in another‘s suicide. Given that it has 
been established that a person may lawfully commit suicide, why then, may a person 
not lawfully invoke the help of another in ending life? What is the justification the 
law gives for making a distinction which clearly results in such an unfair situation?  
 In assessing such a question, it is useful to turn to the cases which have been 
thrust under the media-spotlight. In 1999 Diane Pretty was diagnosed with Motor 
Neurone disease. Her condition rapidly deteriorated, leaving her paralysed from the 
neck down with only months to live. Fearing an undignified death, she sought 
confirmation from the DPP that her husband would not face prosecution if he assisted 
her to commit suicide. The DPP refused to make such an assurance. Pretty sought 
judicial review of the Suicide Act and of this decision, claiming a breach of her rights 
under the ECHR.
92
  
 The House of Lords, in agreement with the Divisional Court, unanimously 
rejected her claim, stating that the DPP has no power for such an undertaking.
93
 
Furthermore, it was held that none of her Convention rights were engaged, and with 
regard to the right to private life, the Court noted that Art.8 prohibits interference with 
the way in which an individual leads their life and it does not relate to the manner in 
which they wish to die.
94
 For this reason, the case collapsed at the first hurdle, and 
thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to explain in any depth the justification for the 
offence of assisted suicide. However, the Court did note that even if Pretty‘s 
Convention Rights were engaged, the Suicide Act would nevertheless be a justified 
interference with this right as it is a proportionate means of protecting the weak and 
the vulnerable.
95
 
                                               
91 Suicide Act 1961 s.2.4. 
92 Pretty sought to rely upon Art.2, Art.3, Art.8, Art.9 and Art.14 ECHR.  
93 R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61. 
94 Ibid at [61]. 
95 Ibid at [97] per Lord Hope. 
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The ECtHR, unlike the House of Lords, found that Art.8(1) was engaged 
because ―the ability to conduct one‘s life in a manner of one‘s own choosing may also 
include the opportunity to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically or morally 
harmful or dangerous nature for the individual concerned‖.96 However, they also held 
that interference fell within the margin of appreciation afforded to the state under 
Art.8(2), as it is necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights of others.
97
 The 
Court explained that s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961,  
 
was designed to safeguard life by protecting the weak and the vulnerable and 
especially those who are not in a condition to take informed decisions against acts 
intended to end life or to assist in ending dying. Doubtless the condition of terminally 
ill individuals will vary. But many will be vulnerable and it is the vulnerability of the 
class which provides the rationale for the law in question.
98
 
 
It was further explained that there is a risk to this group of people which justifies the 
imposition of a ban on assisted suicide.  
The same appeal to the protection of the rights of others was used in the later 
case of R (Purdy) v DPP.
99
 The facts in Purdy appear similar to those in Pretty, but 
there is a substantial difference, in the former the applicant‘s request was for legal 
clarity, whereas in the latter the claim was for immunity from a legal provision. 
Debbie Purdy suffers from Multiple Sclerosis, a chronic progressive nervous disorder 
and subsequently feels that in the future, when her health has deteriorated further, she 
may wish to end her life prematurely. As a result, Purdy requested the DPP clarify the 
law on assisted suicide, so she could assess whether her husband would face 
prosecution if he accompanied her in her trip to the Dignitas clinic in Switzerland 
where she would spend her final days.
100
 She felt that the law in its existing state 
failed to clearly determine when a prosecution would arise.  The DPP declined to 
clarify the legal position and consequently Purdy filed a judicial review action. 
                                               
96 Ibid at [62].  
97 Pretty v UK (No. 2346/02) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1. 
98 Ibid at [74].  
99 [2008] EWHC 2565; [2009] EWCA Civ 92. 
100 Dignitas is a Swiss assisted dying organisation which aims to help individuals end their lives. The 
organisation provides qualified nurses and doctors who are based at specialist clinics who will assist in 
the dying process.  
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Purdy claimed that her rights under the ECHR were breached by the legal 
uncertainty, namely Art.8, the right to private and family life. The High Court and 
Court of Appeal regarded themselves bound to follow the decision of the House of 
Lords in Pretty, and thus, both rejected that her right under Art.8(1) was engaged. 
Moreover, both the High Court and Court of Appeal stated that even if Art.8(1) was 
found to be engaged, the limitation would be justified under Art.8(2), for the 
protection of the rights of others.
101
 Nevertheless, surprising many academics,
102
 in 
their final judgment before the establishment of the Supreme Court, the Lords 
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and followed the ECtHR in Pretty.
103
 
Baroness Hale explained that the ECtHR in Pretty were correct to include end of life 
decisions within the scope of Art.8(1), as the notion of personal autonomy is integral 
to this right.
104
 The Court further held that this right was unjustifiably infringed under 
Art.8(2) by the failure of the DPP to clarify the law. Baroness Hale explained that, 
 
the way in which the DPP had to explain his decision in the case of Daniel James… 
shows that some of the listed factors have to be turned on their head and other 
unlisted factors introduced in order to cater for these difficult decisions. Furthermore, 
as it seems to me, the object of the exercise should be to focus, not upon a generalised 
concept of ―the public interest‖, but upon the features which will distinguish those 
cases in which deterrence will be disproportionate from those cases in which it will 
not.
105
 
 
Consequently, the DPP was ordered to create an offence-specific policy outlining 
when prosecutions will occur.
106
  
In both these pivotal cases, the Court has defended s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961 
with reference to the rights of others. Although this justification is addressed in much 
greater depth in Part Two of this thesis, it is useful to engage in some analysis of this 
claim. The fear is this: that permitting individuals to seek assistance in committing 
suicide will put vulnerable and weak people at risk of being forced to take their lives 
prematurely. More specifically, ―legal machinery initially designed to kill those who 
                                               
101 R (Purdy) v DPP  [2008] EWHC 2565; [2009] EWCA Civ 92. 
102 Stephens 2008 at 268. 
103 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45. 
104 Ibid at [60]-[62] per Baroness Hale. 
105 Ibid at [64] per Baroness Hale. 
106 Published in February 2010, see Crown Prosecution Service 2010. 
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are a nuisance to themselves may someday engulf those who are a nuisance to 
others‖.107 There are three criticisms of this approach I would like make.  
 
4.3.1 A Failure to Fully Justify Their Decision 
 
Firstly, the courts in both cases failed to fully explore their appeal to the rights of 
others, providing no evidence of the degree of any such risk. What is more, they failed 
to fully explain why a complete ban on assisted suicide is a justified means of 
protecting others. The courts did not address in any real depth whether adequate 
safeguards could be used in order to protect others, or whether exceptions could be 
made in cases where the decision is clearly not one made under pressure.  
 
4.3.2 Overlooking Situations Where the Vulnerable Can Already Obtain Assistance 
 
Secondly, the courts argued that permitting assisted suicide would endanger the weak 
and the elderly, yet they failed to acknowledge that there are already instances where 
vulnerable people can obtain assistance in taking their own life. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, a person may lawfully refuse life-sustaining medical treatment or 
request a doctor inject them with a fatal dose of palliative drugs. Surely the 
permissibility of such practices would be subject to the same concerns, yet they are 
lawful without being subject to any regulation or safeguards to protect the rights of 
others. Surely if the law were to be consistent in its approach and for the appeal to the 
rights of others to have any real argumentative force, these other areas of law would 
need to have some protection in place for the weak and vulnerable, protection that 
simply does not exist. These arguments will be addressed in much greater depth in the 
following Part of this thesis, but already it has been established that the complete 
prohibition of assisted suicide cannot be justified with merely a passing reference to 
protecting the rights of the vulnerable.  
 
4.3.3 The Focus on Society as ‗Vulnerable‘ 
 
                                               
107 Kamisar 1958.  
37 
 
 
 
In the cases of both Pretty and Purdy, the courts put a great emphasis on the rights of 
other vulnerable persons in society. To reiterate the words of the Court in Pretty, it 
was explained that s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961, 
 
was designed to safeguard life by protecting the weak and the vulnerable and 
especially those who are not in a condition to take informed decisions against acts 
intended to end life or to assist in ending life.
108
 
 
Similarly, in Purdy, both the High Court and Court of Appeal expressed that even if 
Art.8(1) was engaged, the legal position would be justified under Art.8(2), for the 
protection of the rights of others.
109
 There is a tendency in the end of life debate, to 
focus on others in society as vulnerable and weak, as was the case in both Pretty and 
Purdy. In doing so, the rights of ‗others‘ in society are thrust centre-stage, while the 
rights of those requiring assistance in their suicide are sidelined. I suggest that the 
word ‗vulnerable‘ is so often attached to ‗others‘ that it is often forgotten that those 
who desire a change in the law are often extremely vulnerable themselves. Was Diane 
Pretty, in her debilitated physical state, with her inability to lawfully seek assistance 
in her suicide, not weak and vulnerable? Was Debbie Purdy, in her terrible physical 
state, with her lack of certainty over the current legal position, not also weak and 
vulnerable? What is more, the fact that both women were willing to fight through the 
court hierarchy to acquire more control and information regarding their posit ions 
evidences this very point. Both women were vulnerable, and were trying to alter this 
and regain some independence through arguing their case in a court of law.  
 It is argued that the courts in both cases assume the common mindset that it is 
‗others‘ who are vulnerable, and thus, underplay the terrible position that those who 
are restricted access to assisted suicide find themselves enduring. In doing so, it was 
possible to justify the current legal position. However, there is an alternative that has 
not yet been fully explored. Given that it has been established that those who are 
denied access to assisted suicide are, in fact, extremely vulnerable, it is surely possible 
to reconceptualise them as such. The focus could be shifted from ‗others‘ onto the 
horrifying situation those who desire assisted suicide find themselves in. The question 
is: how could this be achieved? 
                                               
108 Pretty v UK (No. 2346/02) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1 at [74].  
109 R (Purdy) v DPP  [2008] EWHC 2565; [2009] EWCA Civ 92. 
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 Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits torture, or inhumane or degrading treatment 
of any person and there are no qualifications to this human right. Those who are 
prevented access to assisted suicide regularly claim that their situation is degrading,
110
 
and given the emotional strain caused by slow physical deterioration, it is not 
incongruous to suggest that such a situation is also inhumane. Why, then, is more 
emphasis not put on Art.3 when taking assisted suicide issues to court? While Pretty 
relied on Art.3, the Lords swiftly dismissed this argument. In reasoning that the 
positive obligation of the state in this case did not extend to preventing the inhumane 
and degrading situation of those requiring assisted suicide, Lord Bingham stated, 
 
while states may be absolutely forbidden to inflict the proscribed treatment on 
individuals within their jurisdictions, the steps appropriate or necessary to discharge a 
positive obligation will be more judgmental, more prone to variation from state to 
state, more dependent on the opinions and beliefs of the people and less susceptible to 
any universal injunction.
111
 
 
Lord Steyn claimed Art.3 was not engaged because the word ‗treatment‘ does not 
include such circumstances
112
 and Lord Hope reasoned that Pretty‘s situation did not 
reach the required level of severity.
113
 With respect, the judges again underplay the 
severity of the situation Mrs Pretty and others find themselves in, and while they 
explain that the positive duty of the state does not extend this far, they fail to discuss 
why. Each judge spends only a short amount of time addressing Art.3 – this issue was 
brushed over in order to focus more exclusively on Art.8. Unfortunately, due to the 
nature of Purdy‘s claim (focussing on the clarity of the law as opposed to requesting 
exemption) she was unable to invoke Art.3. However, it is suggested that the 
possibility of reconceptualising ‗vulnerability‘ in light of Art.3 of the ECHR has yet 
to reach its full potential. Denying those who cannot assist themselves access to 
assisted suicide can be inhumane and degrading, and thus, it is surprising that this 
avenue has not yet been fully investigated. 
 
                                               
110 See Dyer 2002. 
111 R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61 at [15]. 
112 Ibid at [60]. 
113 Ibid at [91]. 
39 
 
 
 
4.4 Evidence of Unfairness 
 
This and the previous two chapters have sought to illustrate that the current legal 
position is unfair. Whilst it is clear that the law allows some people to exercise the 
choice to end their lives and denies others the very same, if the distinctions between 
the situations could be justified, this difference in treatment would not be unfair. 
Unfortunately, as this thesis has sought to reveal, the distinctions used are arbitrary 
and crumble under any critical analysis, and thus, the legal position is unfair. What is 
more, the reality of the current position is that the law side steps prosecuting those 
who assist in suicide, further revealing this unfairness. 
 
4.4.1 The DPP‘s Guidelines 
 
The assertion that the law is unfair in distinguishing between those who are able to 
commit suicide and those who require assistance, is supported by the reality of the 
current legal position. It is contended that the law inherently recognises the unfairness 
caused if s.2 were to be followed dogmatically as there is an obvious attempt to side-
step such injustice. Despite the fact that s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961 renders assisting 
suicide unlawful, the DPP will rarely consent to the institution of proceedings under 
this offence. Although there have been many instances where the actions of family 
members have clearly amounted to ―assisting‖, of over one-hundred Britons that have 
travelled overseas to receive assistance to commit suicide, not one successful 
prosecution has resulted.
114
 The situation presented is one in which the law prohibits a 
particular action in theory, but in practice, the prosecutorial discretion is exercised to 
overlook such behaviour, in order to avoid unfairness between those able to commit 
suicide unaided and those who require assistance. 
This issue has been particularly pertinent in recent years, as more terminally ill 
individuals have chosen to travel abroad to a country where assisted suicide is legally 
permitted. In most cases such individuals require another to accompany them in their 
journey, as often illness renders them unable to travel unaided, and where it does not, 
most require emotional support at such a significant time. For these people, 
anticipating whether the conduct of their loved one constitutes ―encouraging or 
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assisting suicide‖, and whether they will consequently face prosecution, is of 
paramount importance. Given that such individuals are being forced to make grave 
decisions about ending their lives, further legal complexities about the nature of such 
conduct are especially unwelcome, hence, the case brought by Debbie Purdy 
demanding legal clarity. As previously mentioned, following this case the DPP was 
ordered to create a policy document outlining when prosecutions will be instituted 
under the assisted suicide offence.
115
 An interim policy was introduced in September 
2009 and following a public consultation, the full guidelines were published in 
February 2010. They include a list of sixteen factors in favour of prosecution and six 
against prosecution:  
 
A prosecution is more likely to be required if:  
(1) the victim was under 18 years of age;  
(2) the victim did not have the capacity (as defined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005) 
to reach an informed decision to commit suicide;  
(3) the victim had not reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to 
commit suicide;  
(4) the victim had not clearly and unequivocally communicated his or her decision to 
commit suicide to the suspect;  
(5) the victim did not seek the encouragement or assistance of the suspect personally 
or on his or her own initiative;  
(6) the suspect was not wholly motivated by compassion; for example, the suspect 
was motivated by the prospect that he or she or a person closely connected to him or 
her stood to gain in some way from the death of the victim;  
(7) the suspect pressured the victim to commit suicide;  
(8) the suspect did not take reasonable steps to ensure that any other person had not 
pressured the victim to commit suicide;  
(9) the suspect had a history of violence or abuse against the victim;   
(10) the victim was physically able to undertake the act that constituted the assistance 
him or herself;  
(11) the suspect was unknown to the victim and encouraged or assisted the victim to 
commit or attempt to commit suicide by providing specific information via, for 
example, a website or publication;  
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(12) the suspect gave encouragement or assistance to more than one victim who were 
not known to each other;  
(13) the suspect was paid by the victim or those close to the victim for his or her 
encouragement or assistance;  
(14) the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a medical doctor, nurse, other  
healthcare professional, a professional carer [whether for payment or not], or as a  
person in authority, such as a prison officer, and the victim was in his or her care;  
(15) the suspect was aware that the victim intended to commit suicide in a public 
place where it was reasonable to think that members of the public may be present;  
(16) the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a person involved in the  
management or as an employee (whether for payment or not) of an organisation or  
group, a purpose of which is to provide a physical environment (whether for  
payment or not) in which to allow another to commit suicide. 
 
A prosecution is less likely to be required if:  
(1) the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit  
suicide;  
(2) the suspect was wholly motivated by compassion;  
(3) the actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within the definition of the  
offence, were of only minor encouragement or assistance;  
(4) the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from taking the course of action  
which resulted in his or her suicide;  
(5) the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant encouragement or  
assistance in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to commit  
suicide;  
(6) the suspect reported the victim‘s suicide to the police and fully assisted them in  
their enquiries into the circumstances of the suicide or the attempt and his or her  
part in providing encouragement or assistance.
116
 
 
Despite the insistence that Purdy and the subsequent prosecutorial guidance did ―not 
change the law‖,117 and that the list of relevant factors is ―not exhaustive‖,118 many 
have commented that the policy effectively legalises compassionately motivated 
assisted suicide.
119
 Mullock explains that in reading the policy guidelines, compassion 
                                               
116 Crown Prosecution Service 2010. 
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is ―the key determining factor‖ in assessing whether to prosecute.120 She explains how 
this factor, which relies on the suicidal individual acting autonomously, is pivotal in 
the prosecution and if it is present, no charge will be brought. Is it possible then, that 
if an individual acts solely out of compassion for another in assisting them to commit 
suicide, they are essentially acting legally?  
Let us consider a hypothetical couple, Jane and Kevin. Kevin suffers from 
Motor Neurone disease and his condition has deteriorated to unbearable levels. As a 
result, he requests Jane, accompany him to Switzerland where he plans to seek 
medical assistance in ending his life. Jane, distraught, repeatedly begs Kevin to 
reconsider, but Kevin is determined that this is his final wish and eventually she 
agrees. She, under close instruction from Kevin, books the appropriate flights and 
accompanies him on his final journey. When Jane returns, alone, she is weary and 
heartbroken. Is it possible, given the guidelines published, that Jane would face 
criminal prosecution for her actions? It is suggested that this would be an extremely 
unlikely turn of events. Given that Kevin instigated the discussion regarding ending 
his life and unequivocally expressed this decision, and that Jane first attempted to 
dissuade her husband and her subsequent involvement was reluctant, it seems almost 
impossible that in cases such as this a prosecution would be brought. What is more, 
the House of Lords left the question of whether an offence is committed in this 
situation open
121
 and that Jane was ―wholly motivated by compassion‖. Considering 
that a vast number of cases where UK citizens travel abroad to commit suicide mirror 
this familial pattern of emotion, it appears that these types of cases have been 
excluded from the grasp of the criminal law altogether. Mullock agrees, expressing 
that ―the policy has precisely the effect of sanctioning compassionately motivated 
assisted suicide‖.122 
 Others have noted that it is the demedicalised nature of assisted suicide 
committed by family members travelling abroad, which has pushed this behaviour 
beyond the scope of the criminal law.
123
 Ost explains that this type of assisted death, 
as oppose to physician-assisted death, is more ―emotive and empathetic‖ and 
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121 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45. 
122 Note that this is providing the person providing assistance is not a healthcare professional see 
Mullock 2010 at 445. 
123 Ost 2010 at 413. 
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―recognises the social and emotional aspects of assisted suicide‖.124 Again this theory 
places great emphasis on the idea that ―at the basis of compassion lies an 
identification with the sufferer as a fellow human being, a recognition the similar 
misfortunes may also befall one, insofar as one is human‖.125 In taking assisted 
suicide out of the medical context, the onlooker is in a much better position to 
imagine how they might cope if they faced such a dilemma. Ost argues that it is this 
relatable quality in relatives facilitating assisted suicide abroad, which, through the 
DPP‘s prosecutorial policy, has ―moved the law on assisted suicide forward‖.126 
 However, even if the claims of Mullock and Ost are accepted and the 
prosecutorial policy governing assisted suicide does have the effect of legalising 
compassionately motivated assisted suicide, the playing field can by no means be 
described as level. The reality remains that the policy factors ―are not exhaustive‖ and 
that discretion remains with the Director of Public Prosecutions.
127
 Although it has 
been suggested that such a prosecution is very unlikely, it is not impossible, and this 
lack of reassurance may be something that affects an individual‘s decision. Such a 
person already has to address a plethora of difficult questions: whether to prematurely 
take their life, whether to travel over 700 miles to do so and whether to put their 
family through such an ordeal. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to suggest that the 
risk of prosecution for close family members may be the factor which dissuades an 
individual from making the final journey. Furthermore, the behaviour of the family 
members is stigmatised by the very existence of the offence, their actions being 
clearly defined as ‗criminal‘, providing yet more reasons for an individual to wait for 
death to occur naturally against their will. An able-bodied person, on the other hand, 
has the ability to commit suicide free from fear of prosecution or legal stigma.  
 A second, more compelling, difference between the ability of the able and 
disabled to make a choice to commit suicide, is that the latter must make a long and 
exhausting journey overseas to fulfil their wish. Such individuals must spend their 
final moments in an unfamiliar country, miles from home, usually with a minimal 
number of family members present. For a person suffering from a painful or 
debilitating illness this journey will be particularly unpleasant. In contrast, those of us 
who are physically able can commit suicide in our own homes if we desire. It is quite 
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clear that unfairness persists, despite the prosecutorial attempt to exclude 
compassionate assistors from the scope of the criminal law.  
 
4.4.2 Death Tourism 
 
The legality of accessing suicide in another European country coupled with the 
restrictive legal position in the UK, has seen a rise in death tourism. Each year more 
people travel abroad to receive assistance to commit suicide and following the DPP‘s 
guidelines, it is extremely unlikely that a family member who helps to effect such a 
journey will face prosecution. Since the new guidelines were introduced, there have 
been at least thirty cases reported to the Crown Prosecution Service of individuals 
suspected of helping a loved one to die, but not one has been prosecuted.
128
 If this is 
the case then, you may question how the situation is unfair. An able bodied person 
can commit suicide, an individual receiving life-sustaining treatment can refuse it, a 
person requiring palliative care can request a lethal dose and those who fall outside 
these categories can travel abroad. In theory, then, everyone has the ability to bring 
about the end of his or her own life, and thus, there is no unfairness.  
 However, this is not the case. Travelling abroad to receive assistance in ending 
life has numerous costs and risks which are not involved in the former three 
situations. Such costs can be financial, emotional, mental or even physical. What is 
more, the individual who wishes to journey abroad cannot do so unaided, which raises 
the question: what about those without friends or family to accompany them? What 
about those whose family refuses to accompany them? The current case of a 46-year-
old man Martin, who wishes to remain anonymous, mirrors this exact problem.
129
 
Since suffering a severe stroke which left him almost completely paralysed, Martin 
has been requesting assistance to end his life. His wife, although willing to be present 
when Martin dies, refuses to help him in any way, including travelling abroad. 
Martin‘s lawyer is currently applying for an interim declaration that doctors would not 
be prosecuted for preparing his case, but at present, Martin is enduring the very 
unfairness I have been seeking to expose. While theoretically individuals can travel 
abroad free from prosecution, in reality, the costs endured by these individuals are far 
higher than those who can end their lives in the UK. Furthermore, those without a 
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family to help them remain trapped. Death tourism, rather than providing a loophole 
through which the legal unfairness at end of life is remedied, in fact serves to 
highlight the tremendous grievance inflicted upon those unable to assist themselves.   
 
 
 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
It has been established that s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961 creates another arbitrary 
distinction governing end of life practices. The law permits suicide, but assisted 
suicide is a criminal offence and the result is that able-bodied individuals are 
permitted to end their lives prematurely, without risk of criminal prosecution, yet 
persons who are disabled may only make the same choice if they are willing to risk 
that a family member be prosecuted. Following the House of Lords‘ decision in 
Purdy, the DPP was forced to create a document clarifying when a prosecution is 
likely to be brought under s.2 of the Act. It appears that there is legal recognition of 
the unfair nature of the Suicide Act 1961, as this document has had the effect of 
essentially exempting from the offence, family members who act compassionately. 
However, it has been suggested that such injustice has not been fully remedied by the 
policy. Individuals who are not physically fit must still travel abroad, with all the 
costs and risks involved, and even then the risk of prosecution for family members is 
not entirely non-existent. An arbitrary distinction continues to create an unfairness at 
end of life. To elucidate the injustice that such a position causes, it is useful to turn to 
a final hypothetical example for Part One.  
 Bill was a successful businessman until the recent economic climate when his 
entire enterprise collapsed and he was declared bankrupt. Furthermore, his wife and 
children were tragically killed in a horrific train accident that same year. For twelve 
months, Bill attempted to piece his life together, but finally made the decision that 
without his passion for business, and without his family, his life was no longer  worth 
living. Will was on the very train that killed Bill‘s family, surviving the accident but 
left unable to move any part of his body from the neck downwards. Will‘s family 
were travelling with him too, but unfortunately did not make it out of the wreck alive. 
Like Bill, Will has made the decision that his life is no longer of any value to him. In 
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this scenario, in the comfort of his own home and with the memories of his family 
surrounding him, Bill takes a lethal dose of paracetamol and ends his life. Will, 
however, needs somewhat more assistance if he is to accomplish the same end and he 
calls upon a close friend to place a fatal dose of pills on his tongue. However, the 
friend refuses for fear of prosecution under s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961. Eventually, 
after much persuasion, Will convinces the friend to accompany him to Switzerland to 
end his life. Will and his friend are both uneasy about the legality of their trip, but 
make the venture in the hope that the prosecutorial guidelines will exempt their 
actions from prosecution. Will finally arrives in Switzerland, an unfamiliar country, 
and passes away in the foreign surroundings of a Dignitas Clinic. Is it fair that the 
physical ability of an individual be a deciding factor in whether one can lawfully end 
life? 
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PART TWO  
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT 
UNFAIRNESS 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Part Two of this thesis serves to build upon the findings displayed in Part One: that 
the current legal position regarding end of life is unfair. It is possible that such 
unfairness could be excused if a valid justification could be found for the distinctions 
made, and thus, an analysis of two potential rationales will be made in this second 
half of the thesis. There are broadly two appeals made in defence of the current legal 
proscription of assisted suicide: the first makes a claim to ‗the rights of the self‘ and 
the second, to ‗the rights of others‘. The former is the idea that a person possesses 
rights over their body, some of which cannot be waived by the rights-holder. The right 
not to be killed, for example, cannot be waived and thus, another human being may 
not intentionally take your life even if you make a request. The latter is the claim that 
permitting assisted suicide would cause a greater harm to the rights of other human 
beings in society, and for this reason, should be prohibited in order to their rights.  
 Chapter Five will assess the appeal to the ‗rights of the self‘ and Chapter Six 
will examine the appeal to the ‗rights of others‘ in order to establish that neither can 
coherently defend the current legal position.  
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5.  
AN APPEAL TO THE RIGHTS OF THE SELF 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A common defence of the current legal position, which prohibits assisted suicide, is 
an appeal to ‗the rights of the self‘. The suggestion that every individual has a set of 
rights, some of which are non-waivable by the rights-holder, means that by extension 
certain types of behaviour must remain prohibited. The right to life, for example, is 
often classified as non-waivable. Thus, an appeal to the rights of the self would hold 
that human life should never intentionally be taken, even where an individual wants to 
end their life.  
The ‗rights of the self‘ standpoint takes various forms, all of which invoke 
different reasoning as to why certain rights cannot be relinquished. This chapter will 
first focus on the claim that particular rights cannot be waived, because to do so 
would offend human dignity (classified as Beyleveld and Brownsword as the ‗Dignity 
as Constraint‘ argument).130 The definitional weaknesses of the broader ‗Dignity as 
Constraint‘ argument will be exposed and it will be evidenced that the current law is 
in fact incompatible with this position. The second claim to be addressed, which is a 
more specific variant of the human dignity position, is the sanctity of life position. 
This is the belief that certain rights cannot be surrendered, because to do so would 
undermine the sanctity of human life. An analysis of this position will reveal 
conceptual difficulties with the sanctity of life and evidence that this position is 
incompatible with the current law. Evidencing that the current law directly contradicts 
both these principle will demonstrate that appeals to ‗the rights of the self‘, in these 
two forms, cannot sufficiently defend the current legal unfairness illustrated in Part 
One.  
 
                                               
130 Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001 at 29-47. 
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5.2 Dignity as Constraint 
 
The first appeal to the rights of the self addressed by this chapter is described by 
Beyleveld and Brownsword as ―Dignity as Constraint‖, and holds that some decisions 
should always be prohibited, regardless of autonomy or resulting consequences, 
because they are inherently damaging of human dignity.
131
 For example, in 1995 the 
mayor of a small French town prohibited dwarf-throwing, an activity where 
participants compete to throw dwarves wearing padded Velcro suits, the furthest 
distance. One participant appealed the ban, claiming that he and the other dwarves 
who were involved consented to participate. However, when the application reached 
the Conseil d'État, it was held that the ban was lawful in order to protect public order 
and human dignity.
132
  
Similarly, in Germany, Armin Meiwes was charged and convicted of murder 
after killing and eating a willing and consenting victim.
133
 Bernd Jürgen Brandes had 
responded to Meiwes advertisement on the Internet, which requested a victim who 
would be willing to die for his cannibalistic desires. Despite the consent of the 
deceased, the Court found Meiwes guilty of murder and he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.
134
 Although not directly addressed by the court, cannibalism is 
commonly viewed as offensive to human dignity, and so the decision of the court in 
this case is compatible with the Dignity as Constraint position, providing the 
reasoning is based on a protection of Brandes himself, despite his consent.  
A final example emerges from the English case of R v Brown, the decision 
from which is compatible with the Dignity as Constraint position. In 1994 a group of 
young men were convicted of participating in sadomasochistic acts which amounted 
to criminal assault and wounding.
135
 The question was whether the participants‘ 
consent could amount to a defence – essentially, whether their autonomous right 
                                               
131 Ibid at 29-47. 
132 See the French case Conseil d‘État (October 27, 1995) req. nos. 136-727 (Commine de Morsang-
sur-Orge) and 143-578 (Ville d‘Aix-en-Provence). Please note that while ‗public order‘ is the direct 
translation of the term ‗ordre public‘ used by the French Court, the two terms are not identical in legal 
meaning. The French term ‗ordre public‘ is much wider in meaning, incorporating rules governing the 
economy, morals, health, security, peace and human rights. In English law, public order is much 
narrower, relating more specifically to society.  
133 See the case of the German, Armin Meiwes, who was found guilty of murder after killing and eating 
another consenting individual. Succinctly recorded at BBC News (2006) ‗German cannibal guilty of 
murder‘ available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4752797.stm <Accessed 13/12/10>. 
134 Ibid. 
135 R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75. 
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extended to choosing severe harm. The House of Lords answered this question in the 
negative, and although their reasoning fails to directly address the notion of human 
dignity, it is possible to read it as compatible with Dignity as Constraint if the aim is 
to protect the individual actually consenting.
136
 The same interpretation of the 
reasoning can be made at the ECtHR, where it was again decided that consent cannot 
be a defence to severe harm caused by sadomasochistic activity.
137
  
  
5.2.1 A Valid Defence? 
 
 It is possible that the ‗Dignity as Constraint‘ position can defend the unfairness 
created by the law with regard to ending one‘s own life, providing it can be proven 
that unlawful end of life practices (such as assisted suicide) undermine human dignity, 
whereas the lawful practices do not undermine human dignity (for example refusal of 
life-sustaining medical treatment). In order to ascertain whether this is the case, it is 
necessary to define ‗human dignity‘ and the types of behaviour that will offend it 
more closely. This task is, however, far from uncomplicated. In assessing whether an 
action is permitted or prohibited, how are we to distinguish actions which offend 
human dignity from those which do not? Why is intentionally harming another 
perfectly acceptable in a boxing arena but destructive of human dignity when 
throwing a dwarf? Unfortunately, the approach offers little in terms of defining 
human dignity, a concept often criticised as ―especially vague and ambiguous‖.138 
Such a subjective term requires explanation if this argument is to hold any weight. 
One suggestion offered is that an action will offend human dignity when it is 
contrary to ‗human nature‘. Beyleveld and Brownsword offer an explanation of this 
reasoning: 
 
All human beings have dignity simply by virtue of being human. Dignity is thus an essential 
part of human nature. Therefore, to act contrary to human nature is to act contrary to human 
dignity…139 
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However, surely we are no closer to clearing the fog surrounding the actual definition 
of ‗human dignity‘. This explanation, in fact, merely serves to replace one ambiguous 
concept with another. A new set of questions are posed: what is human nature and 
when is an act considered to offend human nature? The first suggestion is that it is an 
action which opposes the laws of nature. But, as Beyleveld and Brownsword observe, 
―if something is contrary to the laws of nature then it cannot (physically) happen‖.140 
A second submission is that an action offends human nature if it cannot occur without 
human intervention. Again, this suggestion is problematic as is classes almost all acts 
as contrary to human nature, suggesting that ―human action itself is contrary to human 
nature‖.141 Clearly such an explanation is also absurd. Evidently, the argument that 
utilises human dignity with reference to human nature is not fully reasoned. What is 
more, the idea of human dignity can be used to the completely opposite effect, 
evidencing that the way in which human dignity is defined can radically alter the 
types of behaviour which should be prohibited. This opposing view is classified by 
Beyleveld and Brownsword as ‗Dignity as Empowerment‘.142 
‗Dignity as Empowerment‘ is the idea that human dignity requires respect for 
others in providing them with conditions where they can exercise and experience 
dignity. One of these necessary conditions is the freedom and ability to make 
decisions – individual autonomy. Instead of constraining choices to protect human 
dignity (as is the practice with ‗Dignity as Constraint‘), this position upholds 
autonomous choice. Joseph Raz explains how human dignity is defined by the 
‗Dignity as Empowerment‘ ideology: 
 
Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and 
plotting their future. Thus, respecting people‘s dignity includes respecting their 
autonomy, their right to control their future…. An insult offends a person‘s dignity if 
it consists of or implies a denial that he is an autonomous person or that he deserves 
to be treated as one.
143
 
 
This opposite conception of human dignity can be seen in the previous examples 
given, in objecting to the dwarf-throwing ban, the dwarves claimed that the ban 
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represented a lack of respect for their dignity, because it was inconsistent with their 
free choice. Similarly, in the courtroom Meiwes defence claimed that convicting the 
cannibal despite Brandes consent ―is an invasion of Mr. Meiwe‘s human dignity‖.144 
The very existence of these opposing views of human dignity highlights how integral 
the definition is for this type of appeal to ‗the rights of the self‘. If respecting human 
dignity is defined as upholding a particular set of common values, the type of 
behaviour to be prohibited will be different than if the definition is said to involve 
respecting autonomous choice. The former would be likely to prohibit 
sadomasochistic acts such as those seen in Brown, whereas the latter would permit 
them, providing the rights of others were not endangered by such actions. As such, 
without a clear definition the theory does not specify which actions are acceptable or 
unacceptable, and thus, cannot adequately defend the current legal position with 
regard to end of life.  
  Moreover, it is argued that even if such a definition could be clearly identified, 
the appeal to human dignity would still fail to adequately explain why some people 
are prevented from making the end of life choices that others can so freely make. This 
is because, for the theory to provide an adequate justification for the current legal 
position, a person making the choice to end their life through swallowing a lethal dose 
of paracetamol must not offend human dignity; a person who refuses further artificial 
ventilation in order to end their life must also not offend human dignity, neither must 
a cancer patient who requests the doctor inject her with a lethal dose of a palliative 
drug. On the other hand, however, a person who seeks assistance with their suicide, as 
they are too disabled to take their own life, must act in a way which insults human 
dignity. Of course such a suggestion appears absurd. In each case the individual is 
seeking to end their own life, the only difference being in the final case the individual 
requires the direct assistance of a third party. It is possible to suggest that it is this 
third party involvement which renders the latter situation unacceptable, but this is a 
weak argument given that the doctor must play some part in switching off a ventilator 
or injecting the morphine.  
I suggest that the human dignity position, in fact, serves to reveal the scale of 
the unfairness caused by the current prohibition on assisted suicide – surely turning 
our back on those who are suffering and in real need of help is offending human 
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dignity, rather than upholding it. There is both an increasing support and common 
linguistic usage of this idea, evidenced by the increasing desire of those who want to 
take their lives prematurely, to have a ―dignified death‖.145 Moreover, given that 
people are now living longer with a variety of illnesses and diseases, the idea of a 
calm and peaceful death as the dignified option has gained ground in recent years – 
the belief that ending life prematurely offends human dignity loses its power in such a 
medically advanced society.  
  
In sum, I have evidenced that the broader ‗Dignity as Constraint‘ position is flawed as 
it fails to clearly define human dignity and explain what actions will offend it. 
Furthermore, I have argued that even if such a concept had a clear definition, it is 
extremely unlikely that this would serve to defend the unfairness of the current legal 
position with regard to end of life. Such a definition would have to be extremely 
obscure in order that suicide, death by refusal of treatment and death by request for 
life-shortening drugs be compatible with human dignity and assisted suicide offend it. 
What is more, modern understandings of human dignity include dying peacefully at 
the time of one‘s own choosing, rendering it even more unlikely that an appeal to 
‗Dignity as Constraint‘ could be invoked as a defence of the prohibition on assisted 
suicide.  
 The next section will analyse a more specific and clearly defined version of 
the human dignity position, the sanctity of life, in order to further illustrate the point 
that even where definition is unproblematic, arguments from human dignity still fail 
to defend the current legal unfairness with regard to end of life.  
 
5.3 The Sanctity of Life 
 
A second appeal to ‗the rights of the self‘, which is actually a variant of the ‗Dignity 
as Constraint‘ position discussed above, is the sanctity of life view. This position is 
worthy of analysis, given that it is more detailed and extensive than the broader 
‗Dignity as Constraint‘ argument, as it outlines which behaviours offend human 
dignity and why. The doctrine of the sanctity of life holds that innocent human life is 
sacred and thus, should never intentionally be taken. Where an action offends this 
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doctrine, that action must be curtailed. Originally, this was a solely religious position, 
but more recently it has gained a secular supporting. This section will analyse each of 
these strands to ascertain whether either can sufficiently defend the current legal 
unfairness with regard to ending one‘s own life. 
 
5.3.1 The Religious Sanctity of Life Position 
 
In the UK, the doctrine of the sanctity of life has surfaced through the teachings of the 
dominant religion, Christianity. The doctrine holds that the intentional killing of 
innocent human beings is always wrong, owing to the great value religion affords 
human life. Christianity holds that human life is sacred for a number of reasons, 
perhaps the most well known being the sixth commandment handed down to Moses 
on Mount Sinai: ―thou shalt not kill‖.146 Pope John Paul II outlined two other reasons 
as to why the Christian religion affords human life such a special status: 
 
Man‘s life comes from God; it is his gift, his image and imprint, a sharing in his 
breath of life. God therefore is the sole Lord of this life: Man cannot do with it as he 
wills … the sacredness of life has its foundation in God and his creative activity: ‗For 
God made man in his own image‘.147 
 
This passage demonstrates that the Christian religion asserts that human life is created 
in God‘s image.  Thus, to take life would dishonour God. Furthermore, it is claimed 
that life is a gift given to us by God, which only He has the power to take away. Thus, 
to end life prematurely is to usurp God‘s control over us.148 Consequently, Christians 
often claim that humans have stewardship, not dominion, over their lives.
149
 We 
merely occupy our bodies until we are called to death and consequently, do not have 
absolute control over our lives. 
This position is, as with the human dignity position, an essentially duty-based 
ideology which holds that humans have a right to live which cannot automatically be 
waived.  So, for example, if a terminally ill individual, Alex, requests active 
                                               
146 Exodus 20: 2-17. 
147 Wicks 2009. 
148 A law professor at the university of Notre Dame notes, ―By aiming at our own deaths we usurp 
God‘s proper providence in allotting the span of our lives‖ in Kaveny 1977. 
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assistance to commit suicide, the doctrine of the sanctity of life would prohibit this. 
Alex‘s life was given to him by God and thus, only God has the power to take it away. 
The illness Alex is suffering from is part of God‘s plan and as a result, Alex does not 
have the power to end it prematurely. 
As highlighted by Callahan, there are clear benefits from assessing the 
religious perspective in any moral debate, as religion has a wealth of experience in 
tackling the difficult questions medical ethics poses.
150
 Evidence that there are 
benefits in incorporating religious opinion into legal debate can be seen in the 
controversial case of Re A where the parents of conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary, 
refused to consent to an operation which would separate them.
151
 They felt that such a 
separation (which would be sure to end the life of the weaker twin, Mary) offended 
their beliefs as members of the Roman Catholic religion. Unusually, the Court granted 
the Archbishop of Canterbury permission to make written submissions with regard to 
the case. Although the Court of Appeal granted the declaration meaning that a 
separation would be lawful,
152
 contrary to the Archbishop‘s strong belief in the 
doctrine of the sanctity of life,
153
 this case illustrates that the judiciary are of the belief 
that religion can provide useful contributions to tricky ethical questions. 
However, the first criticism of any doctrine which relies on religion for its 
justification is that religion is based on faith rather than reason. Thus, belief in the 
sanctity of life requires that people believe God created man in his own image. It 
requires that people believe God gave life to us as a gift. More centrally, belief in this 
ethical standpoint requires a belief in God. While historically Christianity was the 
dominant religion in the UK, this is no longer the case, as over the decades, a more 
pluralistic and multicultural society has emerged. Keown admits that we have seen a 
decline of established religious belief
154
 and although in a 2001 consensus 71.8% of 
people registered as Christian, Wicks questions how many of these actually visit 
places of worship with any regularity.
155
 Furthermore, it is suggested that in the 
subsequent ten-year period since the study, membership of the Christian religion has 
                                               
150 He states that moving towards secularisation would leave us ―bereft of the accumulated wisdom and 
knowledge that are the fruit of long-established religious traditions‖ in Callahan 1990 at 3.  
151 [2001] Fam. 147.  
152 Ibid.  
153 He stated ―Human life is sacred, that is inviolable, so that one should never aim to cause an innocent 
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154 Keown 2002 at 52. 
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seen further decline. Consequently, as we see fewer adherents of the Christian 
religion, we see a decline in support of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. A theory 
which requires faith for credibility becomes much less persuasive when belief 
diminishes. 
 
5.3.2  The Non-Religious Sanctity of Life Position 
 
Although the sanctity of life doctrine finds its origins in religion, there are also secular 
understandings of the principle that hold human life to be intrinsically valuable, thus, 
avoiding the above criticism. Most famously, Keown attempts to outline three 
positions which value human life, in order to advocate his own support for the 
sanctity of life.  
Firstly, vitalism holds that human life is an absolute good, something which all 
other basic goods must be sacrificed in order to preserve. Therefore, Keown explains, 
―it is wrong either to shorten the life of a patient or to fail to strive to lengthen it‖.156 
Quite simply, vitalism requires human life be preserved at all costs. Secondly, the 
sanctity of life/inviolability of life view is similar to that discussed above in relation to 
the religious approach to sanctity of life in holding that it is always wrong to 
intentionally take the life of another innocent human being.
157
 However, there is no 
duty (unlike with vitalism) to preserve life at all costs, treatment can be withheld or 
withdrawn where it is futile or excessively burdensome. Lastly, the Quality of Life 
position is explained. What is essential for adherents of the Quality of Life position is 
whether an individual‘s life is worthwhile. Keown explains that there is a quality 
threshold, and when a life is no longer worth living, it slips below this threshold and 
can permissibly be ended.
158
 
It must be noted that the sanctity of life position makes an assessment of the 
quality of the patient‘s life before and after the proposed treatment, in order to 
ascertain whether the treatment would be worthwhile. In contrast, the Quality of life 
position seeks to assess the quality of the patient‘s life in order to determine whether 
                                               
156 Keown 2002 at 39. 
157 Note that these two terms will be used interchangeably, as Keown refers to the Sanctity of Life in 
‗Beyond Bland: a critique of the BMA guidance on withholding and withdrawing medical treatment‘ 
20 Legal Studies 66-84; ‗Restoring the sanctity of life and replacing the caricature: a reply to David 
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Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
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their life is worthwhile. In order to clarify this distinction, Keown refers to the former 
as ‗q‘uality of life and the latter as ‗Q‘uality of life, a diction which will be adopted 
here to aid analysis. Keown then provides the following examples to illustrate the 
benefits of the sanctity of life position, and show the weaknesses of the other two 
positions. 
In ―Mary‘s Case‖, an elderly lady with terminal coronary disease is admitted 
to hospital after her third heart attack.
159
 She is likely to suffer more heart attacks in 
the very near future and a decision is needed as to whether cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR) should be used or omitted when this occurs. Due to Mary‘s senile 
dementia, she lacks the capacity to make such a decision and so three doctors come 
together to discuss which path to take. Keown presents Dr (V)italism and Dr (Q)uality 
of life as extreme positions and Dr (I)nviolability of life as the ―ethical middle 
way‖.160  
In response to Mary‘s situation, Dr V explains that human life should be 
preserved at all costs and so CPR should be administered following any subsequent 
heart attacks. Dr Q explains that human life should only be preserved where it is 
worthwhile, and because Mary has lost the ability to think rationally, her life is no 
longer worthwhile. Thus, Dr Q decides that the CPR should not be administered and 
Mary should be allowed to die. Dr I explains that human life should never 
intentionally be taken, but there is no duty to preserve life at all costs. So where 
treatment would be futile or excessively burdensome, it need not be carried out. As 
Mary is dying, Dr I feels the CPR would be futile and so should be withheld.  
In the second hypothetical story, ―Angela‘s Case‖, (which is strikingly 
reminiscent of the case of Re B
161) a baby with Down‘s syndrome has been diagnosed 
with an intestinal blockage which will result in her death without a surgical operation 
to remove it.
162
 Dr V again advocates that life should be preserved at all costs, so the 
operation should go ahead and Angela will live. Dr Q opines that a life with Down‘s 
syndrome lacks quality and is not worth living, and thus, the operation should not go 
ahead and Angela will die. Finally, Dr I advises that, as the treatment will have 
minimal burdens and will clearly benefit the girl by saving her life, the treatment 
should go ahead. 
                                               
159 A hypothetical story used by Keown 2002 at 45-48. 
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5.3.3 A Valid Defence? 
 
Using this approach then, the current legal position could potentially be defended with 
reference to the sanctity of life doctrine. For this to be a satisfactory defence, the 
situations where individuals are legally permitted to end life must not involve  ―the 
intentional taking of an innocent human life‖, and assisting the suicide of another 
must involve this practice. However, the distinctions used to differentiate between 
permitted and prohibited practices collapse under any real scrutiny. Many of the 
distinctions are arbitrary (such as act/omission or intent/foresight), whereas others are 
so complex and contested that they would be almost impossible to apply to the law in 
practice, for example the ‗Q‘/‗q‘ dichotomy. The second criticism of the sanctity of 
life as a defence of the current legal unfairness, is that there exist several situations 
where the intentional taking of human life is legally permitted. This evidences that the 
law is incompatible with the sanctity of life viewpoint regarding its position on end of 
life, and thus, this doctrine cannot justify the legal position which unfairly provides 
some with the power to determine their own end and prohibits others that same 
power. 
 
5.3.3.1 Arbitrary and Unworkable Distinctions 
 
Arbitrary Distinctions 
 
Chapter Two explored the law regarding refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment 
to show that every competent patient has the right to refuse such treatment, even 
where their death will result.
163
 In fact, doctors in this position are legally required to 
comply with such a refusal. Surely then, we are once again facing a situation where 
the law permits the intentional taking of an innocent human life, contradicting the 
sanctity of life position. 
 However, as discussed in the previous part of this thesis, proponents of the 
sanctity of life view argue that the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining 
medical treatment from a patient, where it is certain death will result, is compatible 
with this doctrine. While it is accepted, as the Courts did in Airedale NHS Trust v 
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Bland,
164
 that the doctor‘s behaviour in such cases is certainly intentional, the 
controversial question is whether the doctor is actually killing the patient. The 
justification for this law is that withholding or withdrawing treatment is an omission, 
not an action, and thus, the doctor is not killing the patient. As a result, there is no 
intentional killing of another innocent human being, nature is simply allowed to take 
its course. The act/omission distinction allows proponents of the sanctity of life to 
claim that the doctrine remains intact despite the legal position permitting intentional 
killing. 
The reality is that the distinction is not conceptually or morally valid. 
Conceptually, when withdrawing treatment, a doctor is performing an act and to 
suggest otherwise ―does some considerable damage to the ordinary English usage‖.165 
Morally, although the classification of a behaviour as an act or an omission can affect 
its moral quality,
166
 in this instance it does not. The doctor achieves the same end 
whether he removes treatment from a patient, or injects him directly with a lethal 
substance. In both cases, the patient‘s life is taken as a result of the doctor‘s behaviour 
and the doctor bears no extra risk in directly taking the life of the patient than doing 
the very same through removal of treatment. As argued in Chapter Two, the 
classification of the removal or withdrawal of medical treatment as an omission is 
arbitrary, ―a useful fiction used by the courts to absolve medical professionals from 
criminal liability‖.167 The law has used this arbitrary distinction between acts and 
omissions in order to categorise the withholding and withdrawing of life-sustaining 
medical treatment as legal, as doing so pushes this conduct outside of what is deemed 
unacceptable from the sanctity of life perspective. 
Similarly, the law regarding the administration of fatal doses of palliative care 
uses an equally arbitrary distinction in order to render the behaviour compatible with 
the sanctity of life, and thus, render it legally permissible. As explained in Chapter 
Three, a doctor who administers a lethal dose of medication to a patient, in the 
knowledge that it will end life, acts lawfully providing that the treatment has a 
palliative effect. This is a result of the doctrine of double effect, the idea that an act 
which has both a positive and a negative outcome, may be permissible providing that 
the intention is to achieve the positive outcome and the negative is an unavoidable 
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side effect. In this case the doctor must primarily intend the palliative effect of the 
drug, with death as an unintended yet foreseen consequence. As argued in Chapter 
Three, I suggest that the doctrine of double effect holds no moral weight. Whether the 
doctor intends or foresees the death of the patient in these cases, the consequence is 
the same, and as Harris suggests, what is morally relevant is the effect our actions or 
inactions have on the world.
168
 
Again the law is using a legal fiction to arbitrarily permit certain types of end 
of life practices (requesting life-shortening medical treatment), yet prohibit others. 
The sanctity of life is yet again being used as a tool to draw a line between 
permissible and impermissible behaviours, but unfortunately, the position of this line 
cannot be properly justified.  
 
Unworkable Distinctions 
 
In addition to their arbitrary nature, the ‗Q‘/‗q‘ dichotomy is an example of the 
complex nature of the distinctions made by the sanctity of life. On closer analysis of 
the dichotomy this difficulty is revealed as Keown himself misconceives the Quality 
of life position he seeks to reject. Secondly, when the moral basis of the distinction is 
unpacked, it is demonstrated that the line between quality of life and Quality of life is 
so hazy that it would be unworkable in practice. Finally, Keown fails in his examples, 
to address one, central issue – that most adherents of this position believe only the 
patient can assess whether their own life is worthwhile and thus, the patient must first 
request termination. For these reasons, the sanctity of life would be an extremely 
difficult principle for the law to follow in regulating end of life.  
 
Keown Misconceives the ‗Quality of life‘ 
 
Keown‘s criticism of the Quality of life position, as advocated, is that it involves an 
assessment of the worthwhileness of a patient‘s life. Inevitably, such an analysis will, 
at times, result in the removal or withholding of treatment because a person‘s life is 
judged to ―lack worth‖ or, more emotively, because the patient is ―better off dead‖.169 
There are clear complications in allowing doctors to make such subjective 
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judgements. Such determinations do not afford equality to all (only to those deemed 
to have a certain Quality of life) and, as Keown rightly suggests, ―the criteria 
identifying lives thought to lack benefit are inherently arbitrary and vague‖.170 There 
is an added danger that, as advocated by disability rights activists, able-bodied 
persons in fact underestimate the quality of a disabled persons life.
171
 The Quality of 
life position, viewed in this way, is inherently discriminatory, unfair and would 
produce inconsistent treatment decisions in patients with the same underlying 
condition.  
 However, in an intensive dialogue with Professor Keown, Professor Price 
suggests this conception of the Quality of life position is distorted, and ―the idea that 
the QOL position somehow assesses the worth of individuals is fundamentally 
misconceived‖.172 Rather, Price suggests that the Quality of life position merely takes 
into account the patient‘s life as a whole in assessing the validity of treatment. For 
example, in Mary‘s case (above), the terminal coronary disease, her age, fragility and 
likelihood of repeat heart attacks would be relevant to the assessment of whether to 
administer the CPR should she require it. These health issues are not only central to 
Mary‘s quality of life, but also fundamental to whether the treatment will be 
worthwhile in improving her life. Thus, the doctor will not be making a judgment 
about whether he believes her life is worthwhile, but about whether, given all the 
external circumstances, the treatment is likely to be of benefit. It appears that Price‘s 
depiction of the Quality of life position is actually an assessment of the 
worthwhileness of treatment, not of life, as Keown suggests. If this is the case, both 
the sanctity of life position and Quality of life position are judgments of the 
worthwhileness of treatment, yet the Quality of life assessment is much wider, 
including an assessment of underlying conditions or disabilities. Already, as Price 
presents an alternative and more persuasive explanation of the Quality of life position, 
the complexities of this distinction are revealing themselves.  
 
‗Q‘uality of Life and ‗q‘uality of Life: A Blurred Distinction? 
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On Price‘s interpretation, what remains are two positions regarding the value of life 
which are not so straightforwardly antithetical. The Quality of life position is no 
longer as morally objectionable as it first appears. So the question is then raised – 
which, if either, of these positions are ethically defensible? When assessing whether 
to treat patients, should doctors refrain from taking into account other aspects of the 
patient‘s life (Quality of life), or should the doctor look solely to the worthwhileness 
of treatment at hand (sanctity of life)? 
 Price strongly advocates the inclusion of physical and mental disabilities when 
deciding whether to perform a particular treatment. In fact, he suggests that it is 
essential to do so, because in attempting to ignore these conditions the doctor is 
endeavouring to divorce the individual patient from the condition or treatment. He 
suggests, 
 
Treatment does not exist in a vacuum. This is an attempt to ‗medicalise‘ such 
decisions and to (supposedly) sanitise them of any moral element, which is simply 
unrealistic quite apart from anything else.
173
 
 
Price questions the practicality of making a treatment decision in isolation from the 
individual themselves, citing Rhoden, who questions, ―Can decision makers really 
disregard handicaps of this magnitude?‖.174 For this reason, Price contends that the 
―(‗q/Q‘s) dichotomy is false; it is not feasible to draw any bright line between such 
notions, either practically or ethically‖.175 
 In his response, Keown defends the q/Q dichotomy insisting that Price‘s 
claims are all ―wide of the mark‖.176 Rather than denying the appreciation of external 
conditions, Keown argues it is how the condition is taken into account that is ethically 
relevant: providing the assessment of the condition is used to ascertain the 
worthwhileness of treatment (and not worthwhileness of the patient‘s life) it is 
morally acceptable:  
 
It is not a question of whether the principle takes physical and mental disabilities into 
account but of how it takes them into account. Such disabilities may well be relevant 
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in assessing the worthwhileness of a proposed treatment but the principle does not 
allow their use in and assessment of the supposed worthwhileness of a patient‘s 
life.
177
 
 
In illustrating the validity of the distinction between ‗Quality of life‘ and ‗quality of 
life‘ assessments, Keown refers to the case of Angela, the baby born with both an 
intestinal blockage and Downs syndrome (discussed above). He forcefully suggests 
that there is surely a difference in choosing to treat the intestinal blockage because the 
treatment would be worthwhile (as it will save her life) as oppose to refusing to treat 
because the doctor does not judge a life with Downs syndrome to be worthwhile.  
 However, as Price rightly notes, it seems that Keown is rejecting any 
recognition of how Downs‘s syndrome impacts on the life of the individual.178 Thus, 
contra Keown, for the sanctity of life position it is not a question of how the condition 
is taken into account, but whether it is considered at all. Another example presented 
by Keown gives further evidence for this point. Regarding a patient in Permanent 
Vegetative State (PVS), Keown explains that, 
 
given the patient‘s incapacitated condition and the inability of ventilation to restore 
them to health and well-functioning, ventilation would be futile. A decision to 
withhold or withdraw a treatment because it cannot restore the patient to health and 
well-functioning is not a decision that the patient lacks value.
179
  
 
However, this extract highlights a fundamental flaw in Keown‘s reasoning. Why is it 
that in Angela‘s case Downs syndrome is not a relevant consideration as to whether 
the surgery to remove the blockage will be worthwhile, yet PVS is a relevant 
consideration when deciding whether to ventilate? The purpose of the surgery is to 
remove the blockage in the intestine and thus, save Angela‘s life. Equally, the 
ventilation is required to give oxygen to the patient and save their life. Why then, does 
Keown accept the recognition of the former condition but not the latter?  
 It appears that Keown‘s attempt to extricate judgments about the 
worthwhileness of treatment from their underlying condition or disability promptly 
fails when the condition is of such severity that it cannot be ignored. Surely then, 
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permitting an assessment of only those disabilities and conditions which are 
considered overwhelming is in fact a Quality of life judgment in itself? It appears we 
are back where we began, at Price‘s assertion that we cannot practicably separate 
judgements regarding underlying conditions and disabilities from the treatment at 
hand. Keown seems to have affirmed the very point he was attempting to disprove. 
The line between a quality of life judgment and a Quality of life judgment does not 
seem so clear. 
 In attacking the Quality of life position, it appears that Keown is, to invoke the 
common phrasing, ‗calling the kettle black‘. The sanctity of life doctrine asserts that 
the Quality of life position is arbitrary and unjust, but in taking into account some 
conditions and not others when ascertaining the worthwhileness of a proposed 
treatment, the sanctity of life position is guilty of these exact deficiencies. Surely it is 
more consistent and appropriate within the medical context to treat each patient as an 
individual, assessing his or her situation as a whole rather than, in a futile attempt to 
avoid judging the worthwhileness of a patient‘s life, arbitrarily acknowledging some 
disabilities and not others?  
 In conclusion, the above analysis of the dialogue between Professor Keown 
and Professor Price highlights that Keown‘s conception of the Quality of life is 
misconceived. When properly understood, the Quality of life position seeks to take 
into account underlying conditions and disabilities in treatment decisions, in an 
attempt to envisage the individual in their entirety, as oppose to focusing on the 
treatment question in isolation. What is more, the difficulties in separating out 
questions of ‗q‘uality of life from those of ‗Q‘uality of life have been exposed and the 
complications this presents for Keown‘s sanctity of life position have been revealed. 
 
Keown Ignores Autonomy 
 
Unfortunately, there is a final gaping flaw in Keown‘s illustrations: he uses only one, 
extremely unpopular approach to the Quality of life position. The Quality of life 
position focuses on the worthwhileness of a person‘s life, so when life is no longer 
deemed worthwhile, it can be ended either by act or omission. Keown fails in his 
examples, to address one, central issue – that most adherents of this position believe 
only the patient can assess whether their own life is worthwhile and thus, the patient 
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must first request termination. Thus, a doctor could not make a judgement regarding 
whether life is worth living. In fact, merely pages before, Keown admits that, 
 
Some who subscribe to this doctrine would require the patient‘s request as a 
precondition of termination on the ground that only the patient is in a position to 
judge whether life is still worth living.
180
 
 
It is respectfully suggested that ―Some‖ should be replaced with ―Most‖. It is 
extremely difficult to find an academic, or indeed any person, who would agree that a 
doctor should intentionally end the life of any patient he feels is no longer 
worthwhile. If that was the case, your doctor could decide that because you suffer 
from severe autism, your life is not worth living, and intentionally take your life. 
Similarly, if you lost both legs in a car accident, another doctor could deem a life 
without walking, running and dancing as no longer worthwhile and end your life. Of 
course, there are very few, if any who would support this ideology, yet it is the one 
which Keown uses in his examples. In doing so, Keown is able to conceptualise the 
Quality of life doctrine as engaging in ―discriminatory judgments, posited on arbitrary 
criteria such as physical or mental disability‖,181 when in reality, most proponents of 
the Quality of life position only allow such judgements to be made entirely 
autonomously by the individual in question. Surely, then, Keown‘s criticism of the 
Quality of life position as arbitrary and unjust evaporate entirely when the question of 
whether life is worth living is left to the individual? 
Keown quickly dismisses this suggestion, claiming that autonomous choices 
only warrant respect when they are in accordance with a framework of sound moral 
values.
182
 He explains, ―where the choice is immoral, whether because it would harm 
others or oneself, what claim to moral respect can it have?‖183 Therefore, as Keown 
sees taking life as harming oneself, this is immoral and should be prohibited. 
Subsequently, the Quality of life position which advocates autonomy as the deciding 
factor in ending life cannot stand up in face of this reasoning. 
However, a substantial issue rests with the justification presented for 
respecting only morally desirable decisions. Keown takes an extremely narrow 
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approach to the scope of autonomous decisions, making no distinction between 
decisions that harm others and those that do not. He suggests that any decision which 
is immoral should not warrant respect. The reasoning provided is: ―The capacity to 
choose brings with it the responsibility of making not just any old choice, but choices 
that do in fact promote, rather than undermine, human flourishing‖.184 However, 
Keown fails to explore this notion of ‗human flourishing‘ in any depth. Rather than 
explain the reasons why only such choices should be respected, Keown proceeds to 
use extreme examples in order to make his point: 
 
Is there a ‗right to choose… paedophilia‘? Or a ‗right to choose … cruelty to 
animals‘? Does the mere fact that someone wants to blind ponies or have sex with 
children carry any moral weight?
185
 
 
While these examples are emotive, they fail to explain why there is no difference 
between autonomous choices that harm another and  those which do not. It is strongly 
suggested that a decision which causes harm to the self, e.g. assisted suicide, is 
entirely different to decisions which harm other living beings, e.g. paedophilia or 
animal cruelty. In failing to explore this distinction, or indeed explain his reasoning 
more fully, it is difficult to accept Keown‘s tight restrain on autonomy. 
 
In sum, the distinctions made by the sanctity of life between permissible and 
impermissible behaviour at the end of life are extremely problematic. Those discussed 
in Part One of this thesis, and again in this chapter, cannot be fully justified, and thus, 
place arbitrary restrictions on end of life practices. The ‗Q‘/‗q‘ dichotomy, when 
unpacked, is barely a dichotomy at all as the boundaries between the two assessments 
are blurred. What is more, this distinction is so complex that to use and apply it in the 
legal context would be almost impossible. For these reasons, the law regarding end of 
life could not be successfully governed by the sanctity of life doctrine, and the 
following section reveals this to be true – the current law is not, in fact, based on this 
principle.  
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5.3.3.2 The Law Permits the Intentional Taking of an Innocent Human Life 
 
The second criticism of the sanctity of life as a defence of the current legal unfairness, 
is that the law in certain areas already permits the very behaviour the sanctity of life 
prohibits: the intentional taking of the life of another innocent human being. Abortion 
law is one area with which the sanctity of life doctrine is incompatible. Excluding 
situations where abortion is an unintended yet forseen consequence of another 
medical procedure, abortion is the intentional cessation of the life of the fetus. The 
more controversial question is whether abortion is the intentional taking of an 
innocent human life. If this is the case, and the fetus is classified as ‗human‘, then the 
law permitting abortion directly contradicts the sanctity of life doctrine, which 
prohibits the intentional taking of an innocent human life. If the law contravenes this 
principle, then the sanctity of life cannot be used as a shield to defend the prohibition 
of assisted suicide. It is illogical to suggest the justification for the prohibition of 
assisted suicide is an adherence to the sanctity of life, when the law permits human 
life to be intentionally taken through specified grounds laid out in the Abortion Act 
1967.  
 What is the definition of a human then? Is it a being that is biologically a 
member of Homo sapiens, or does the status of human require more, something that 
has all the qualities and functions of a rational being? This issue and the question of 
the moral status of the fetus are both extremely controversial, and there has been a 
wealth of academic literature discussing these issues in the medical debate 
surrounding abortion.
186
 However, entering into such a debate directly is beyond the 
scope of this thesis; the most important issue to address is what is considered ‗human‘ 
from the sanctity of life perspective – if the fetus is a human from this perspective, 
then abortion contravenes the sanctity of life. Although, as Pattinson highlights, ―the 
duty-based camp is compatible with any criterion of moral status [of the fetus]‖, the 
sanctity of life position most commonly advocates that the definition of a human 
being is their humanity, their belonging to the species of homo sapiens.
187
 Keown 
notes that while such a view has its roots in Judeo-Christian religion,  
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with or without this theological underpinning, the doctrine that human life 
possesses an intrinsic dignity grounds the principle that one must never 
intentionally kill an innocent human being.
188
 
 
Finnis attempts to explore this reasoning further, and explain why being a member 
of the Homo sapiens makes a moral difference. He suggests this is because, 
 
 
every living human being has this radical capacity for participating in the manner as 
a person – intelligently and freely – in human goods. That is, every living being 
which results from human conception and has the epigenetic primordia…of a human 
body normal enough to be the basis of some intellectual act is truly a human being, a 
human person.
189
  
 
Thus, Finnis suggests, that a human being is having the radical capacity to think and 
act rationally. It is unimportant if the being in question cannot actually think or act in 
this way, for example infants or those who are mentally disabled. It is the potential to 
do so that is key. Keown explains while you may never learn to speak Swahili, as a 
member of the human race you have the innate capacity to do so.
190
  
 However, as suggested by Beyleveld and Brownsword, the term ‗radical 
capacity‘, used by Finnis, must be referring to some kind of ‗species potential‘ if it is 
to apply to all biological human beings.
191
 While the idea that all those who have the 
potential to become a member of a species (in this case, Homo sapiens) explains why 
adherents of the sanctity of life prohibit abortion, Finnis‘ explanation does little more 
than this. The ideas of ‗radical capacity‘ and ‗species potential‘ do not, as the 
literature suggests, provide a justification for the view that the fetus counts. On this 
analysis then, the sanctity of life position does little to explain the moral reasoning 
behind the status of the fetus. 
Nevertheless, although not fully reasoned, the sanctity of life position on the 
status of the fetus is the one which must be applied. Taking this suggestion that 
―humanity is one‘s capacity to live the life, not of a carrot or a cat, but of a human 
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189 Finnis 1995 at 31. Emphasis added. 
190 Keown 2002 at 40. 
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being‖, an unborn fetus is a human being.192 While it may not have rational abilities 
such as autonomy and understanding, the fetus has the capacity to act in this way in 
the future, and thus, according to the sanctity of life perspective, a fetus is a human. 
Consequently, abortion is the intentional taking of an innocent human life, a conflict 
with the sanctity of life position. What is more, this is not the only area of law where 
intentional killing of innocent human being is permitted. 
A second instance were the law permits the intentional taking of innocent 
human life, is taking the life of one‘s self, suicide. To briefly recap Chapter Four of 
this thesis, s.1 of the Suicide Act 1961 decriminalised suicide, not to encourage or 
condone such behaviour, but in order to discourage it.
193
 The parliamentary reports 
show that in the 1960s, suicide was still considered a ―mortal sin‖, and thus, its 
decriminalisation ―in no way lessens, nor should it lessen, the respect for the sanctity 
of human life which we all share‖.194 Keown‘s claim that suicide remains unlawful 
despite s.1 of the Act, was proven in the previous part of this thesis to be 
nonsensical.
195
 By definition, a behaviour that is ‗unlawful‘ must contravene some 
criminal or civil standard, yet committing or attempting to commit suicide has no 
legal ramifications whatsoever. The reality is, whether suicide is viewed as 
undesirable or not, the law permits the intentional taking of one‘s own life.  
 This again illustrates that the law cannot defend the current legal unfairness 
with reference to the doctrine of the sanctity of life. This doctrine prohibits the 
intentional taking of an innocent human life, and suicide is exactly that. The law, in 
permitting suicide, directly contradicts the sanctity of life position with regard to end 
of life.  
 
In sum, this section has revealed that the sanctity of life argument is flawed as it is 
based on arbitrary distinctions. Both the act/omission distinction and the doctrine of 
double effect rely on morally irrelevant criteria, thus fuelling the unfairness exposed 
in Part One of this thesis. What is more, the sanctity of life doctrine cannot be used to 
justify the current legal unfairness at end of life, as both abortion legislation and the 
decriminalisation of suicide demonstrate that the law permits the intentional killing of 
another innocent human. Thus, the prohibition of assisted suicide cannot logically be 
                                               
192 Finnis 1995 at 30. 
193 See Chapter Four in particular pages 30-31. 
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195 See Chapter Four page 31. 
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defended with reference to the sanctity of life, given that in other areas of law the 
doctrine is completely undermined. A school cannot logically prohibit girls smoking 
cigarettes with reference to the promotion of a healthy lifestyle, if it contradictorily 
permits boys to smoke.  
5.4 Summary 
 
It has been established that the ‗rights of the self‘ arguments presented in this chapter 
are either flawed or underdeveloped, and thus, are not sufficient to defend the current 
unfair legal position which permits some end of life choices yet arbitrarily prohibits 
others. In its current undefined state, the human dignity as constraint approach 
contributes very little to the debate surrounding end of life. Moreover, modern 
understandings of what constitutes ‗human dignity‘ suggest that this position is 
incompatible with the current law. 
 While the sanctity of life view is more extensive, this position also struggles to 
defend the current unfairness with regard to ending one‘s own life. The doctrine itself 
makes use of arbitrary distinctions to define permissible and impermissible end of life 
situations. Moreover, the position itself is incompatible with the current law in other 
areas. Adherents of the sanctity of life prohibit the intentional killing of an innocent 
human being, yet an examination of both the Abortion Act 1967 and s.1 of the Suicide 
Act 1961 show that the current law permits just that. For these reasons, both the 
broader human dignity approach and the sanctity of life position fail to adequately 
justify the unfair legal position outlined in Part One of this thesis. 
 
 
72 
 
 
 
 
6.  
AN APPEAL TO THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Arguments which appeal to the rights of others take various forms, however, this 
chapter aims to focus on one particular type of ―rights of others‖ claim. The colourful 
metaphors used to illustrate this argument are many and varied – ―The camel‘s nose is 
in the tent‖, ―a foot in the door‖, ―give an inch and they will take a mile‖, ―opening 
the floodgates‖ and ―the thin end of the wedge‖.196 Those in the legal sphere will 
perhaps be more familiar with the fear of a ―slippery slope‖. Despite their euphemistic 
disguises, each phrase refers to the same course of action. The idea is that a particular 
unobjectionable, or even desirable practice (A), should nevertheless remain 
prohibited, because allowance of A may lead to an undesirable activity or activities 
(B). This is an extremely basic outline of the structure of a slippery slope argument, 
and as Smith notes, there may be ―several intervening steps before we get to the actual 
bad consequence.‖197 
The slippery slope argument is commonly invoked in many areas, but is 
perhaps most frequently utilised in the legal sphere, given the future-orientated focus 
of legislation. This philosophical argument anticipates how the decisions we make 
now will affect future practices, and thus, is particularly relevant in this debate as the 
law is perhaps the most prominent decision-making tool used to shape the future.
198
 
Thus, reference to the slippery slope can be found in a wide range of legal discourse, 
ranging from human rights law
199
 to the medical context,
200
 and in particular with 
regard to end of life decisions.  
                                               
196  See Schauer 1985 at 361. 
197 Smith 2005a at 19. 
198 See Schauer 1985 at 382-383. 
199 In particular the debate surrounding freedom of speech. See Schauer 1985. 
200 The slippery slope arguments can be seen emerging in numerous debates regarding medical ethics. 
For example, the abortion debate (see Keown 2002 at 71-72); the debate regarding reproductive 
technologies (see Pattinson 2009 at 292-293). 
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In transferring the slippery slope principle to end of life situations, the 
argument follows that although assisting in the suicide of another may be an 
acceptable behaviour in some situations; such a practice should remain prohibited, as 
legalisation may result in other undesirable types of death. Proponents of the slippery 
slope allude to numerous negative consequences of permitting assisted suicide, the 
most extreme being a return to the Nazi-style death camps.
201
 More moderately, 
Keown has suggested that allowing autonomously requested assisted suicide may lead 
to less acceptable forms of death. The first is non-voluntary active euthanasia 
(hereafter NVAE) where a doctor takes the life of a patient who is not competent to 
make such a request. The second is involuntary active euthanasia (hereafter IVAE), 
where a doctor takes the life of a patient, without their request, where the patient 
would have been competent to make such a decision.  
 Part One established that the current law governing end of life decisions is 
unfair, as it permits certain decisions regarding how and when to end life, but 
arbitrarily prohibits others. This chapter seeks to ascertain whether such unfairness 
can be justified by an appeal to the ‗rights of others‘. This is the contention that 
although permitting assisted suicide may be beneficial for a particular class of 
individuals; this practice must be prohibited in order to protect the rights of others in 
society. This is essentially a claim to the slippery slope, and thus, this section seeks to 
unpick this argument in order to illustrate that it can hold no weight in defending the 
current legal position.  
John Keown is a particularly prominent academic in the slippery slope arena 
and his work gives a deep and intellectual insight into this phenomenon.
202
 Thus, this 
chapter uses his understanding of the two types of slippery slope in order to examine 
the principle more closely. Firstly then, a discussion of both the logical and empirical 
arms will evidence their fundamental flaws. However, even if it could be proven that 
there is a risk of a slippery slope movement, the simple existence of this risk is not in 
itself enough to justify a complete prohibition on assisted suicide. It must be 
demonstrated that the feared end result is worse than the current harm caused by legal 
proscription. Consequently, the next section will attempt to make such a comparison 
of the corresponding harms and in doing so will reveal that it is not the case that the 
harms outweigh the benefits. Finally, an analysis of the current law will illustrate that 
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the slippery slope argument cannot consistently defend the legal unfairness, because a 
variety of end of life decisions which hold the same risks of abuse are nevertheless 
legally permissible, despite a lack of safeguarding.  
 
6.2 The Logical Slippery Slope 
 
Through the logical slippery slope argument, Keown claims that a slide from 
voluntary active euthanasia to NVAE or IVAE is unavoidable, ―because the case for 
euthanasia with those limitations is also, logically, a case for euthanasia without 
them‖.203 Keown explains that if assisted suicide were permitted, a patient would 
autonomously request assistance from their doctor, who would assess whether the 
request should be granted. He argues that in making this assessment, doctors would 
essentially be required to determine whether the patient would be ―better off dead‖.204  
Without such a judgment, the patient‘s request would not be granted, and for this 
reason, Keown conceptualises the doctor‘s conduct as pivotal in the end of life 
process. He explains,  
 
the real, rather than the rhetorical, justification for VAE is not the patient‘s 
autonomous request but the doctor’s judgment that the request is justified because 
death would benefit the patient.
205 
 
Keown then suggests that if the autonomous request is merely a trigger to the doctor‘s 
judgment, it is thus an unimportant requirement that would soon be disposed of.
206
 He 
claims that if assisted suicide were legalised, it would soon be argued that such 
practices should extend to the incompetent: if doctors have the ability and power to 
make judgment about the value of their patients‘ lives when competent, why should 
this ability and power not extend to the incompetent? The doctor‘s decision-making 
could even extend to competent patients who do not request it. Keown uses a 
hypothetical example to bring his argument to life. Dr A has two patients who are 
identical twins, X and Y. They are both suffering from painful terminal illnesses and 
are suffering the to the same degree. X is competent and requests Dr A inject him 
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with a fatal dose of potassium chloride to end his life. Y is incompetent, and so X 
requests the same treatment on Y‘s behalf, given that Y must too be suffering 
unbearably. Keown asks: ―Is Dr A to deny Y the same benefit he has agreed to confer 
on X?‖.207  
Nevertheless, the most obvious response to such an argument is this: it is the 
autonomous wish of the patient, and not the doctor‘s assessment, which is pivotal in 
the decision-making process. The autonomy of the patient is central and without its 
existence, assisted suicide would not be permitted. For this reason, assisted suicide 
could not be extended to an incompetent patient such as Y, given that they do not 
have the mental capabilities to make such a request. Thus, autonomy provides a 
foothold which prevents a slide down the slope.  
However, Keown anticipated such a challenge and in response developed a 
counter argument, questioning, ―if VAE is justified by respect for self-determination, 
how can it be right to deny any patient who autonomously asks for [assisted suicide] 
whether or not they are experiencing ‗unbearable suffering‘?‖208 Thus, if the 
importance is shifted from the doctor to the patient, and autonomy is then the central 
moral requirement, there is nothing to prevent a slide down the other side of the slope, 
allowing assisted suicide to any person who autonomously requests it. Smith 
highlights how Keown sought to ―trap supporters of euthanasia legislation‖ in 
presenting his argument in this way.
209
 Whether the reader places emphasis on the 
doctor‘s role or the patient‘s request, ―Keown has provided an argument that the 
acceptance of VAE or PAS will lead logically to the acceptance of arguments that few 
would endorse‖.210 
If the logical slippery slope argument presented by Keown can withstand 
examination (assuming it is accepted that NVAE and IVAE are undesirable 
endpoints) then it could potentially provide a justification for the current legal 
unfairness. Assisted suicide would have to remain prohibited as legalisation would 
logically lead to other undesirable practices.  
However, the logical argument is fundamentally flawed, for three reasons, The 
first is that it is misconceptualised as a slippery slope argument. Secondly, Keown 
overlooks an obvious solution to the problem his argument poses, and finally, Keown 
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assumes that doctors must necessarily be making a judgment about the value of a 
patient‘s life.  
 
6.2.1 Misconceptualised 
 
The first, and most central criticism, is that the logical slippery slope argument is 
misconceptualised as a slippery slope claim. For an argument to be classified as such, 
the acceptable practice (A) must be different from the feared outcome (B).
211
 The very 
nature of a slope connotes a downward movement from one set of acceptable 
circumstances to another set of unacceptable circumstances. If the practice at the top 
is the same as that at the bottom, we would be dealing something very different, a 
level surface. However, in this case Keown argues that VAE and NVAE should 
logically be treated the same because the doctor‘s role is the same in both 
circumstances. Smith agrees, ―It is because they are the same that Keown suggests 
that they should be treated in the same manner. In fact, if they were different, 
Keown‘s argument would lose all of its force‖.212 For this reason, Keown‘s logical 
argument is better conceptualised as ―argument from consistency‖.213 The value of 
reconfiguring the argument is that any further evaluation can be appropriately and 
effectively made.  
 
6.2.2 An Obvious Solution 
 
Even when reconfigured as an argument from consistency the logical case is deeply 
defective. If undesirable consequences arise when placing sole importance on either 
the autonomous choice of the patient or the decision-making capacity of the doctor, 
then a potential solution is glaringly obvious – quite simply, moral weight should be 
afforded to both the patient‘s request and the doctor‘s decision. Each condition is 
individually necessary for the permissibility of assisted suicide, but they must both be 
present if they are to be sufficient.
214
 Smith explains that Keown has confused a 
necessary condition and a sufficient condition in the development of the logical 
                                               
211 Schauer agrees, explaining that ―the slippery slope argument responds to an asserted difference 
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argument, as he treats each individual condition as solely sufficient for assisted 
suicide to proceed.
215
 In fact, I suggest that both conditions must necessarily be 
present. 
 If we return to Keown‘s original presentation of the logical argument, he 
classifies the patient‘s request as merely ―a trigger‖ and appears to suggest that for 
this reason it is unimportant and would eventually be overlooked, causing the slide 
down the slippery slope.
216
 However, I respectfully suggest that to claim the patient‘s 
request will eventually be disregarded because it is a trigger, is a non sequitur. In fact, 
the very nature of a trigger suggests that it is necessary for the proceeding actions to 
occur. The dictionary definition describes a trigger as any event that sets a course of 
action in motion.
217
 Without the stimulus of the patient‘s request, the doctor cannot 
make any judgment, as his role is simply not initiated. Furthermore, to describe the 
patient‘s request as ―not decisive‖ is also misleading.218 While it is not the final 
deciding factor, it is nevertheless a deciding factor. Keown suggests that because the 
autonomous request does not come second, it is somehow less important, but this is 
not the case.  The patient‘s request is required before the doctor‘s role can even 
commence.  
 
6.2.3 Doctors Will Not Necessarily be Assessing the Worth of a Patient‘s Life 
 
There is one final criticism of the logical argument I wish to make. Keown assumes 
that the doctor will necessarily be making a decision about the value and worth of a 
patient‘s life before providing them with assistance in suicide. As ―doctors are not 
robots who mindlessly comply with their patients‘ wishes‖ they will unavoidably 
make a judgment of this nature.
219
 Moreover, Keown asserts that this must be the 
function of the doctor, because if the role were confined to assessing whether a 
patient‘s request was autonomous, a psychologist or councillor could easily discharge 
the same function.
220
 However, as Smith notes, this argument is weak.
221
 Given the 
close relationship between doctor and patient, especially in situations where there is a 
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long, protracted illness, the doctor is often extremely well placed to assess the 
patient‘s request. Arguably, other healthcare professionals involved in the day-to-day 
care of the patient may be in an even better position to assess the request.  
Nevertheless, a doctor is likely to understand the request and whether it is based in 
autonomous choice much better than a stranger such as a councillor or psychologist 
who has had no previous dealings with the patient. For this reason is it perfectly 
reasonable to assume that the role of the doctor will be to assess the autonomous 
request of the patient, and not whether that patient is ―better off dead‖.222 If this is the 
case, the doctor does not possess the transferable power to make judgments about the 
quality of life, thus preventing a slide to NVAE. 
 
In sum, aside from being misclassified as a slippery slope claim, the logical argument 
is fundamentally flawed. Keown assumes that the patient‘s request and the doctor‘s 
decision are sufficient, rather than necessary conditions, and thus, when sole 
importance is attached to either of these claims a fear of a slide down the slippery 
slope materialises. Fortunately however, I hope to have demonstrated that the solution 
is simple. If both conditions must be present for assisted suicide to proceed, any risk 
of a slip towards undesirable end of life practices is remedied. Moreover, the role of 
the doctor would be confined to an assessment of whether the patient has made an 
autonomous request, and thus, there is no logical link to suggest that doctors would 
soon begin to administer assisted suicide to non-competent patients who are unable to 
make such a request. Thus, Keown‘s logical slippery slope argument fails, and 
accordingly, cannot justify the current legal unfairness. 
 
6.3 The Empirical Slippery Slope 
 
Through the empirical slippery slope argument, Keown claims that a slide from 
voluntary active euthanasia to NVAE or IVAE is unavoidable, because ―safeguards to 
prevent it cannot be made effective‖.223 Unfortunately, Keown gives minimal 
explanation as to why safeguards cannot be successfully enforced, merely suggesting 
that ―perhaps‖ doctors will break away from regulation for various reasons – they 
may fail to oversee whether requests are being autonomously made; they may lack the 
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relevant psychiatric expertise; they may lack time and resources; doctors may 
misdiagnose patients; societal attitudes may change.
224
 Keown attempts to illustrate 
his claim through presenting an analogy with abortion practices in the UK to provide 
evidence of the existence of this type of slippery slope.  
 
6.3.1 Abortion 
 
Until the Abortion Act 1967 was passed in October of that year, abortion on most 
grounds was illegal in the UK.
225
 Opponents of legal change appealed to a slippery 
slope argument: it is wrong to permit abortion on health grounds, because in doing so, 
there will be a slide towards permitting abortion on social grounds. Seven years after 
legalisation, Dr John Habgood, the then Bishop of Durham, explained how 
legalisation of abortion has caused a slide to the bottom of the slope as doctors 
regularly ignore the safeguards and abortion is frequently permitted on social 
grounds.
226
 In application to the end of life context, the Bishop warned of ―similarly 
far-reaching and potentially more dangerous consequences from legalised 
euthanasia‖.227 
 However, the argument that abortion provides evidence of the slippery slope is 
not so straightforward. It is widely accepted that before the legislation permitting 
abortion on various grounds, backstreet abortions were commonplace. Such practices 
were extremely dangerous, often resulting in damage to the health of the woman or 
even in her death.
228
 The motivations behind seeking illegal abortions were not only 
confined to medical and health reasons: women commonly sought abortions for social 
reasons too. For example, many women already had big families and could not afford 
to have more children.
229
 Such evidence suggests, contrary to Dr John Habgood‘s 
assertion, that abortion on social grounds was already being performed years before 
                                               
224 Ibid at 73. 
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the Abortion Act 1967. Therefore, the Act cannot straightforwardly be said to have 
resulted in the practice of abortion for social reasons. 
 However, even if it could be shown that the number of social abortions did 
increase after the Act was introduced, this evidence alone is not enough to prove the 
existence of a slide down the slippery slope. For the existence of such a slide to be 
revealed, it must be proven that the Act caused this increase. It is possible that 
external factors caused this increase in abortion for social reasons, for example, an 
increase in social acceptance of this practice or a decline in the quality of 
contraceptive education. Pattinson touches on this idea of causation when he 
questions whether the Act did not, in fact, bring about a change in social attitudes 
(and thus cause an increase in social abortion) but whether ―wider acceptance of 
abortion lead to the Act‖?230 Unless it can be shown that the Act caused the increase 
in social abortions, Habgood‘s argument fails.  
 Furthermore, the difficulty in obtaining empirical evidence proving that the 
Act caused the increase, is extremely problematic. Conducting a social study which 
can control all extraneous variables is, without breaching ethical standards, extremely 
difficult. Thus, the possibility of obtaining such objective evidence is extremely 
unlikely (this issue is discussed further in the next section). What is more, transferring 
these findings to an end of life context is not uncomplicated. Abortion and end of life 
are two very different subject areas, for example, while the ethical debate surrounding 
abortion is split regarding the moral status of the fetus,
231
 an individual requesting 
assisted suicide, (provided they have capacity) will always be ‗full status‘ and able to 
make a request. For this reason, the Select Committee have agreed that public reaction 
to the legalisation of assisted suicide would be different to that of abortion, as there is 
―unlikely to be the same degree of pressure to exploit loopholes‖ in law permitting 
assisted suicide because as humans we have ―a natural desire to stay alive‖.232  In 
order to successfully argue that abortion can provide a comparison for end of life, 
more is needed than Habgood‘s assumption that the experiences of one can be so 
unquestionably mapped onto the other. 
 
                                               
230 Pattinson 2009 at 567. 
231 Ibid at 251. 
232 Select Committee 2004-05 at [95]. 
81 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Other Jurisdictions 
 
Keown makes a second analogy in an attempt to demonstrate that a slide down the 
slippery slope cannot be prevented. A sizeable portion of his book, Euthanasia, Ethics 
and Public Policy focuses on gathering and analysing data collected in the 
Netherlands, where assisted suicide is legal.
233
 From around 1970, case law developed 
to allow a physician to use the defence of necessity when terminating the life of a 
patient on request, or assisting in their death and eventually this position was codified 
in the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
passed in April 2001, making the Netherlands the first nation to legally condone such 
practices. As such, three surveys have taken place in 1990, 1995 and 2001 in order to 
assess the impact of the legislation, the results of which Keown uses to illustrate 
existence of the empirical slippery slope. The 1990 study revealed 1000 cases where 
life has been shortened without explicit request – NVAE or IVAE. In response, 
Twycross contends that this ―demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that in the 
Netherlands the slippery slope is already a reality‖234 and Keown agrees claiming that 
―for inhabitants of such a flat country the Dutch have proved remarkably fast 
skiers‖.235  
However, the value of such empirical data is extremely exaggerated by 
Keown. In analysing the three Dutch studies and a further two studies, I hope to 
demonstrate the problematic nature of attempting to obtain sound statistical evidence 
of an empirical slippery slope. To begin with Keown and Twcross‘ analysis of the 
1990 study, the obvious response is that a single statistic cannot possibly show 
evidence of a slippery slope, by its very nature. A slope is a movement, a decline, 
from one set of circumstances to another and consequently, in order to prove its 
existence, figures must be taken from at least two separate points in time. Moreover, 
when compared with the later years, the surveys fail to even evidence a rise in the 
number of IVAE or NVAE over the eleven year period. Instead, the studies show 
these numbers have remained steady; in 1990 0.8% of assisted deaths were conducted 
without an explicit request, 0.7% in 1995 and 0.7% in 2001.
236
 Keown challenges 
these figures, claiming that due to differing definitions of ‗euthanasia‘ and inaccurate 
                                               
233 Keown 2002 at 81-136.   
234 Twycross 1995 at 160. 
235 Finnis 1995 at 26. 
236 Smith 2005a at 33. 
82 
 
 
 
accounts, the number is likely to be much higher.
237
 Admittedly the studies are limited 
and cannot be conclusive, however, even if the actual numbers of IVAE and NVAE 
were much higher than those reported, as Keown suggests, we are still no nearer to 
establishing support for the empirical slippery slope. To do this, there would need to 
be a comparison of the number of NVAE and IVAE before assisted suicide became 
permissible, with the figures post-legalisation.
238
 Only if such a comparison 
demonstrated a rise in the number of NVAE and IVAE cases after legalisation, would 
we be any closer to revealing the existence of an empirical slippery slope. At this 
time, however, no such statistical data is available, and the figures as they stand do 
little more than show the existence of NVAE and IVAE practices in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, the Kuhse-Singer Survey published in 1997 reported that the 
number of incidents of NVAE was in fact higher in Australia, a country where 
voluntary euthanasia is illegal, than in the Netherlands, where voluntary euthanasia is 
legal.
239
 The study compared these two countries as they have similar populations and 
death rates and similar standards were used in questioning as were employed in the 
Dutch studies.
240
 On analysing this outcome, it has been suggested that this study 
undermines the credibility of the empirical slippery slope as the legality of voluntary 
euthanasia appears to have no effect on the number of incidents of NVAE.
241
 If the 
danger of a slippery slope were real, we would expect the Netherlands to have a 
higher number of NVAE cases in comparison to Australia, where voluntary 
euthanasia is illegal; otherwise there is no justification for such prohibition. Thus, the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Victoria claims that the Kuhse-Singer Study findings  
―undermine the so-called slippery slope arguments‖.242 
However, this interpretation of the Kuhse-Singer study has been open to 
criticism. Bagaric suggests that the study shows exactly the opposite – it ―in fact 
supports the slippery slope argument‖.243 In Australia, although voluntary euthanasia 
practices are prohibited in theory, in reality no doctor is ever prosecuted for such 
                                               
237 Keown 2002 see Chapter Nine.  
238 Otlowski 1997 at 439. 
239 Kuhse, Singer, Braume, Clark and Rickard 1997. 
240 Bagaric 2002 at 234-235. 
241 For example see Otlowski, ―the practice of bringing about death without explicit request is much 
more widespread in Australia – a country where the practice of active voluntary euthanasia is 
prohibited – than it is in the Netherlands where the practice has been quasi-legalized and is regulated‖ 
in Otlowski 2000 at xiv.  
242 Bagaric 2002 at 235. 
243 Ibid at 232.  
83 
 
 
 
behaviour. In fact, out of the 6,700 illegal cases reported in the Kuhse-Singer study, 
not one faced prosecution.
244
 Thus, Bagaric explains: 
 
In substance the law prohibiting euthanasia by doctors is not enforced and the legal 
situation at the time of the survey was not in any meaningful respect different to that 
in the Netherlands during the times of the relevant surveys.
245 
 
As a result,  
 
The Kuhse-Singer survey in fact supports the slippery slope argument. It provides 
another piece of evidence that in an environment where euthanasia is condoned, there 
is a significant level of abuse by doctors in relation to end-of-life decisions.
246
 
 
While it is accepted that the study fails to undermine the slippery slope due to the lax 
Australian approach to prosecution of voluntary euthanasia, it is by no means 
accepted that the Kuhse-Singer survey provides support for the empirical slippery 
slope. A slippery slope refers to a process of circumstances getting worse. While the 
survey illustrates the level of NVAE or IVAE when voluntary euthanasia is condoned, 
a comparison of a proscriptive environment is still lacking. Again, this survey fails to 
either prove or disprove the existence of an empirical slippery slope. 
  However, Willems et al. succeeded in making such a comparison between a 
country where voluntary euthanasia is prohibited and one where it is permitted, albeit 
a comparison of attitudes, as opposed to levels of NVAE and IVAE.
247
 This study 
compared attitudes to end of life decisions of physicians in the US (which 
criminalises assisted suicide in all but one of the states) and physicians in the 
Netherlands. Surprisingly, given the difference in legislative positions, the findings 
indicate extreme similarities between the attitudes of doctors in the two countries. 
This directly contradicts Keown‘s assertion that the legalisation of assisted suicide 
would result in a change in social attitudes (as he claims was the case with 
legalisation of abortion), as both countries project a similar outlook on end of life 
practices despite legalisation in the Netherlands. Consequently, Smith has highlighted 
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that, ―this study provides some evidence against the practical slippery slope based on 
a change in attitudes‖.248 However, again this study merely assesses the attitudes of a 
limited number of physicians from a small sample of just two countries. Thus, this 
study is also limited and cannot conclusively disprove the existence of a logical 
slippery slope.  
After analysing this range of studies and illuminating their flaws, I hope to have 
revealed the difficulty of establishing convincing empirical evidence of a slippery 
slope. Given that every study is different, using varying methods, study groups, 
definitions and variables, it is almost impossible to make a comparison between them. 
What is more, given the extremely sensitive subject area and the stringent ethical 
guidelines attached to studies of this nature, creating an effective study is even more 
unlikely. As discussed briefly with regard to the abortion analogy,
249
 without the 
power to control extraneous variables (something which I suggest is impossible 
without contravening ethical guidelines), we are unable to conduct a study which 
conclusively illustrates that allowing practice A directly causes negative practice B. 
The problematic nature of obtaining concrete ‗objective‘ evidence is the Achilles‘ 
Heel of the empirical slippery slope argument.  
 
6.4 The Bottom or the Top of the Slope: Which is Worse?  
 
Presenting a slippery slope argument is not as simple as evidencing that a particular 
practice carries a risk. Once such a risk is established, it must then be demonstrated 
that the risk of the feared endpoint outweighs the current harms caused by the 
proscriptive legal position. Without this part of the analysis, almost every human 
activity could potentially be prohibited, given the ability to use almost anything for an 
immoral purpose. Pattinson explains that fire can be used to deliberately burn others, 
the World Wide Web can be used to distribute bomb-making instructions and germ–
line therapy can provide evil dictators with a means of creating mass eugenics 
programmes.
250
 However, each of these practices has far-reaching benefits which 
have the potential to outweigh such risks. As Pattinson explains: 
 
                                               
248 Smith 2005a at 27. Emphasis added. 
249 See above at 79-80. 
250 Pattinson 2009 at 16. 
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Fire has the potential to prevent people from freezing, the World Wide Web has the 
potential to disseminate medical and educational information, and germ-line therapy 
has the potential to prevent some otherwise fatal conditions. If we ignore the potential 
benefits, then we become obliged to prohibit every new development. Such broad-
brush claims would require regression to a state of being that is incompatible with 
human freedom of action, simply because human freedom enables the occurrence of 
immoral outcomes.
251
 
 
Thus, in order to justify a complete prohibition on assisted suicide, merely asserting 
that such practices are risky is not enough; a deeper analysis of the potential harms is 
required. Emanuel has attempted to engage in such a discussion in his article, through 
comparing the potential benefits of legalising assisted suicide with the likely harms.
252
 
He seeks to ascertain the number of Americans who would benefit from legalisation, 
that is, the number of competent individuals suffering in pain, who wish to make the 
decision to end life:  
 
I estimate that each year, of the 2.3 million Americans who die, approximately 5,000 
to 25,000 patients might have a distinct dying process with a significant and 
unremitting pain, desire euthanasia or PAS [physician-assisted suicide], and be 
competent to repeatedly request and consent to euthanasia or PAS.
253
 
 
Subsequently, Emanuel seeks to contrast this number with the number of individuals 
who could potentially be pressured by such legislation, as they impose a financial or 
care giving burden upon both society and their family members:  
 
Among the 1 million competent patients with a dying process who might be eligible 
to request euthanasia or PAS, these data suggest that 86,000 to 24,000 impose a 
significant financial burden while 160,000 to 340,000 impose significant care giving 
burdens on their families.
254
 
 
From this analysis Emanuel asserts that if just a small percentage of those who could 
potentially be pressured into ending their life prematurely were so coerced, this 
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number would easily equal, if not exceed the number of individuals who would 
benefit from legalisation. For this reason, he concludes that the likely harms of 
legalisation of assisted suicide outweigh the potential benefits, thus, the slippery slope 
argument prevails. 
 With respect, I have two major criticisms to make of Emanuel‘s work. Firstly, 
the figures Emanuel uses to come to his conclusions are questionable, often reached 
through a series of guesses. As his assertions are based on these numbers, his 
argument crumbles if they are proven to be inaccurate. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, the harm done to those who desire assistance in their suicide is seriously 
underplayed. Situating ourselves at the top of the slope is causing a great deal of harm 
that is often overlooked. Thus, the ideas explored in Chapter Four again emerge, 
highlighting an opportunity to reconceptualise the situation of those prevented access 
to assistance and view end of life through the lens of Art.3 of the ECHR which 
prohibits inhumane and degrading treatment. 
 
6.4.1 Numerical Speculation 
 
The first criticism of Emanuel‘s paper is that the figures he uses largely emerge from 
guesswork. In estimating that only 5,000 to 25,000 people will benefit from 
legalisation, Emanuel‘s starting point was to establish how many people have a 
distinct and protracted dying process in which requesting assisted suicide would be 
possible. While he recognises that this number is unclear, Emanuel nevertheless 
provides his own ―crude estimate‖ of 50 percent of all deaths.255 No further 
explanation is given detailing why this number was chosen, a number I believe to be 
particularly low. An empirical study conducted just four years later indicates that the 
percentage is in fact higher: across six European countries, two-thirds of the 
population die from a distinct dying process.
256
 In another study, solely focused on 
death patterns in the Netherlands, it was reported that seventy percent of all deaths 
have a distinct dying process.
257
 Although it is possible that there will be some 
difference between patterns of death in Europe and the United States, given that the 
US is a particularly medically advanced country and has the ability to prolong life in 
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similar ways utilised in Europe, the difference is not likely to be of the degree 
suggested by Emanuel. If we then refigure the number of Americans who die every 
year from a distinct dying process in accordance with the empirical data, the figure is 
closer to 1,610,000 people, 610,000 more than suggested. Emanuel makes other 
guesses, regarding the percentage of patients who die incompetent and the number of 
patients who are likely to request assistance in suicide, and consequently, the 
assertions he makes from the figures become substantially less compelling.
258
    
 Moreover, Emanuel quantifies the harms and the benefits by adding together 
the number of persons affected – a strictly utilitarian approach. However, such an 
attitude is problematic, as minor interests can be aggregated to outweigh a major one. 
To take a hypothetical example, imagine there are six surgeons and four patients, one 
patient requires a heart operation which would save his life and three other patients 
require minor surgery – the removal of an in growing toenail. The heart operation 
requires all six surgeons to be present, while the toenail removal requires two 
surgeons per patient. The surgeons have to decide which operations to undertake. In 
this case, if the benefits and harms were added in the way presented by Emanuel in 
his work on assisted suicide, the six surgeons must treat the three patients requiring 
toenail removal, even if this results in the death of the patient with a heart defect 
because three patients will benefit and just one will be harmed. Obviously aggregating 
minor interests to outweigh a major one is absurd; the harm committed in allowing a 
patient to die clearly outweighs the benefit of three patients successfully having a 
toenail removed. Emanuel fails to address how valuable the corresponding harms and 
benefits are in making his comparison. 
On the other hand, the harms caused by the potential abuses are nowhere near 
as great as suggested by Emanuel. In the UK we benefit from the National Heath 
Service, and thus, in contrast to the US, financial burdens are  less likely to be a factor 
which would cause abuses. Care giving duties will also be less likely to result in 
abuses than in the US, again, as family members have the opportunity to receive 
assistance from the welfare state. 
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6.4.2 The Harm Caused to Those Requesting Assisted Suicide is Underplayed  
 
The benefit of legalising assisted suicide should not be underestimated, as it is 
extremely valuable to those individuals who require it, however small the number of 
people. The significance of this benefit, and the subsequent harm caused by 
criminalisation, are evidenced by the tenacious court appeals undertaken by both 
Debbie Purdy and Diane Pretty: for them, this ability would restore some element of 
control to the lives of those suffering at the hands of a debilitating illness.  
As discussed previously in Chapter Four, Emanuel appears to focus solely on 
the harm that would potentially be done to others if assisted suicide were legalised, at 
the expense of any discussion of the harm currently being caused. Once again the 
common construction of ‗others‘ as vulnerable dominates his writing, but as already 
suggested, surely it is the group of people denied assisted suicide that are the real 
vulnerable persons? The discussion regarding ‗the rights of others‘ is another area in 
which this is overlooked, another area where such arguments may be developed.  
In assessing the balance between the top and the bottom of the slippery slope, 
weighing the harms and the benefits against each other, the harm caused to those who 
require assisted suicide is key. If the debate could be reconceptualised in order to 
reveal the horrific reality of the harm caused to the vulnerable persons who require 
assistance, the balance of the scale could potentially be tipped. The nature of the 
debate on assisted suicide could be altered. It can further be argued that the blanket 
ban on assisted suicide in the UK breaches Art.3 of the ECHR which prevents 
inhumane or degrading treatment. Given that many of those who require assisted 
suicide do so because they feel their situation is degrading, this prospect is not 
improbable. Exploring this avenue is a potential way forward for the assisted suicide 
dialogue which so often focuses on ‗others‘ to the detriment of those who are 
currently suffering. 
To summarise, much more than guesswork is required when addressing the 
question of whether the risks of legalising assisted suicide outweigh the potential 
benefits. Even when accurate figures are presented, the analysis requires more than a 
mere aggregation of the numbers of people affected: there must be an in depth 
examination of the value and weight of the potential harms and benefits. 
Unfortunately, Emanuel fails to engage in such an assessment, an assessment which 
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reveals that legalisation would be intensely valuable to those who require it, and that 
the scope for abuse is much narrower than that anticipated for our transatlantic 
counterparts. What is more, he focuses mainly on the vulnerability of ‗others‘ in 
society and ignores the susceptibility of those who are denied access to assistance. 
The balance of harms and benefits of permitting assisted suicide is likely to be vastly 
altered when the harm caused to those requesting assistance is acknowledged more 
fully. Moreover, there is a possibility of using Art.3 ECHR to frame the terrible harm 
currently being caused.   
To contextualise the findings thus far, it has been revealed that the logical 
slippery slope fails, the empirical slippery slope lacks evidential support, and 
moreover, when the benefits of legalisation are weighed against the risk of harm, the 
scale is not heavily tilted towards the risk of harm as opponents of assisted suicide 
often claim. Accordingly, the suggestion that the slippery slope could serve to justify 
the current legal unfairness is becoming substantially weaker.  
 
6.5 Current Legal Position  
 
If there was any remaining possibility that the slippery slope could still provide a 
valid justification for the legal unfairness exposed in Part One, the current legal 
position itself removes any such possibility. As explained previously, the law requires 
a doctor comply with a valid refusal of medical treatment even where this will result 
in the death of a patient
259
 and a doctor who administers a life-threatening dose of 
drugs to a patient acts lawfully providing such medication has a palliative effect.
260
 In 
both these situations the law essentially permits a doctor to help bring the life of the 
patient to an end. The question then arises: how can the law consistently defend the 
offence of assisted suicide by appeal to the slippery slope, when such practices which 
have the same effect are regularly carried out in our hospitals with no safeguards to 
prevent potential abuses? Surely the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment and 
the administration of lethal palliative care carry very similar, if not identical, risks as 
assisted suicide by other methods. There is a possibility that individuals will feel 
pressured to request either their medical treatment be removed or they be treated with 
a lethal dose of medication. There is a risk that doctors would eventually extend such 
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practices to patients who are incompetent, or who have not made a request. The same 
dangers apply to both the legal and the illegal conduct and it is precisely the role of 
the law to put adequate safeguards in place to protect from such dangers. 
Consequently, for the legal position to be defended by reference to the slippery slope, 
we must be able to make some distinction, a distinction which explains why assisting 
a patient through the impermissible route resists safeguards and carries more risks 
than the permissible route.  
 It is possible to argue that the practices are distinct. The risks do not apply to 
the types of assisted suicide discussed in Chapters Two and Three, as the ability to 
end life in these ways is not well known. A patient is unlikely to be persuaded, given 
that family members will be unaware of this route and the existence of the ability to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment or request a lethal dose of palliative care is not widely 
acknowledged by society. Thus, for a patient to receive such assistance, it is necessary 
that they request it themselves and it is unlikely it will be something at the forefront of 
their minds. However, such arguments are weak. The doctor is still aware of the legal 
position regarding such practices and is likely to inform the patient of this as a 
potential treatment option. What is more, the fear of doctors extending their practices 
to incompetent and non-competent patients remains. The difference seems slight and 
is unlikely to have any real effect on the dangers posed by these types of permissible 
assisted suicide. The reality remains that the practices are extremely similar and it is 
inconsistent for appeal to be made to the slippery slope in defending the current 
prohibition of assisted suicide, when assisted suicide is already taking place free from 
any safeguards. 
 To review the main points, a hypothetical comparison is useful. Imagine I 
have two twin daughters aged fifteen: Amy and Anna. Both want to go out with their 
different set of friends and then walk home alone at midnight. Primarily, I refuse 
Anna, but permit Amy. However, my approach is not consistent; both girls are fifteen, 
both are equally streetwise and both would be subject to the same risk of kidnap, 
mugging, rape or murder. The potential dangers apply to both girls. This same 
principle is reflected in the current law regarding end of life. The law cannot 
consistently allow some assisted suicide practices, yet prohibit others through an 
appeal to the slippery slope. Unless it can be established that the former has some 
special characteristic which excludes it from the dangers of the slope, the law cannot 
appeal to the ‗rights of others‘ in proscribing the latter.  
91 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
 
 
6.6 Summary  
 
This section has established that the slippery slope arguments presented are flawed, 
and thus, are not sufficient to defend the current unfair legal position which permits 
some end of life choices yet arbitrarily prohibits others. The logical slippery slope 
fails to withstand critical analysis and the empirical slippery slope is based on 
inconclusive evidence. What is more, the extreme difficulty of conducting a study to 
obtain valid evidence has been revealed. Moreover, on analysis of the comparison 
between the dangers of legalisation and the potential benefits, it becomes clear that 
the harms are often exaggerated while the value of legalisation for those who are 
suffering unbearably is underplayed. Furthermore, there is a possibility of using Art.3 
ECHR to frame this unbearable situation and alter the focus of the debate through 
realigning the vulnerability construct. Finally, the law cannot consistently use slippery 
slope arguments to defend the current position, given that there are a number of types 
of assisted suicide that are permitted: if the slippery slope is a real danger, why are 
such practices legal, and why do they go on without safeguards to prevent abuse? 
Without significant development, it appears that the current legal position cannot be 
defended with reference to ‗protecting the rights of others‘. The slippery slope is 
unable to defend the current legal position from critical objection.   
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7.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis began with an identification of two main aims: firstly, to ascertain the 
fairness of the current legal position regarding ending one's own life, and secondly, to 
determine whether such unfairness (if found) could be justified. The introduction 
established a fictional scenario framing these issues, to which it is useful to briefly 
return throughout this concluding chapter.
261
 You will recall that Alice took a lethal 
dose of paracetamol and lawfully committed suicide, Beatrice lawfully refused life-
sustaining ventilation, dying as a result and Candice requested her doctor lawfully 
administer a dose of palliative care she knew would be fatal. You, however, a sufferer 
of Motor Neurone disease, could not commit suicide unaided because of your 
physical condition. Moreover, you were not receiving any life-sustaining treatment 
and did not require palliative care and any person who attempted to help you would 
have committed a crime under s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961. The question posed was 
this: how can such a situation possibly be fair? What are the distinctions the law 
makes between these four situations which permit individuals in the first three to end 
their lives, yet leave those in the final situation tragically trapped?    
 
7.1 The Law is Unfair 
 
The first arbitrary distinction the law makes, addressed in Chapter Two, is between 
those permitted to refuse life-sustaining treatment in order to end life, and those who 
are not receiving such treatment. Beatrice desired assistance in ending her own life, 
and as she was attached to an artificial ventilation system, she had the ability to refuse 
such treatment and effectively receive such help. Re T established that a patient may 
lawfully make such a refusal and the subsequent case of Re B determined that a doctor 
must comply with a refusal of life-sustaining treatment if he is to avoid committing 
the tort of battery.
262
 A sufferer of Motor Neurone disease does not usually require 
such life-sustaining treatment and any doctor who assists such a person to commit 
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suicide commits a crime, punishable by a maximum of fourteen years 
imprisonment.
263
 The distinction the law makes between these two situations, 
expounded in the case of Bland, is that the former is an omission to treat while the 
latter is an act. 
 For the unfairness caused by this legal position to be justifiable, there must be 
a moral difference between acts and omissions, and moreover, this moral difference 
must exist with regard to withholding and withdrawing treatment. It was found that in 
many instances, an omission is less morally culpable that an act, because it is an 
omission. This is the case where there are more costs or risks to a person involved in 
acting, than would exist if omitting to act. The example was given of pushing 
someone into an electric fence versus omitting to attempt to rescue a person already 
being electrocuted. The latter entails serious physical risks, which render it less 
morally culpable than the former. However, it was found that such a difference in 
costs and risks does not exist with in the context of withholding and withdrawing 
treatment versus assisting in the suicide of another directly. Both carry the same cost 
and risk to the doctor (providing assisted suicide was legalised), and thus, no moral 
difference exists. This lack of moral difference between omitting to treat and acting to 
end life means that the distinction the law makes is arbitrary, unjustifiable and causes 
grave unfairness. 
 The second arbitrary distinction the law makes, addressed in Chapter Three, is 
between those receiving palliative care and those who are not. Candice had extremely 
painful terminal cancer and lawfully requested her doctor administer a dose of 
palliative care she knew would be fatal, in order to obtain assistance in ending her 
life. The doctrine of double effect means that doctors who act in this way do not 
commit a crime providing their primary intention is to alleviate pain, even if death is 
an almost certain side-effect.
264
 A sufferer of Motor Neurone disease does not usually 
require such treatment for physical pain and so any doctor who administers a fatal 
dose of medication commits the crime of assisting suicide, if not murder.
265
 The 
distinction the law makes between these two situations is that in the former, death is 
foreseen, whereas in the latter, death is intended.  
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 While Keown vehemently defends this distinction, claiming that intending 
death is more morally culpable than foreseeing death as a side-effect, he fails to fully 
reason why this is the case.
266
 This argument is based on the assumption that 
intending to bring about the death of another human being is always morally wrong. 
However, this is merely a supposition. It has been argued, in fact, that as medical 
advancements keep us alive much longer with a range of diseases and illnesses, 
ending life intentionally and prematurely is not always viewed as immoral. If assisting 
in the suicide of another is not morally undesirable then the intent-foresight 
distinction collapses and we therefore face another arbitrary, unjustifiable and unfair 
legal distinction.  
 Finally, Chapter Four addressed the arbitrary distinction the law makes 
between those who are able-bodied and those who are disabled. Alice was able to 
commit suicide after the death of her husband and children, through ingesting a lethal 
dose of paracetamol. In doing so, Alice acted lawfully, as the crime of suicide was 
abrogated by s.1 of the Suicide Act 1961. A sufferer of Motor Neurone disease 
cannot, by the very nature of the illness, physically end their own life, and again, any 
person who assists them commits a crime.
267
 The distinction the law makes between 
the two situations is that in the former others in society are not at risk, whereas the 
latter poses a risk to other vulnerable persons.
268
  
 While the main discussion surrounding the argument from ‗the rights of 
others‘ is found in Chapter Six, it is argued that (in its current form) this distinction is 
unpersuasive. Convincing evidence that others in society would be negatively affected 
by the legalisation of assisted suicide simply does not exist,
269
 and what is more, 
assisted suicide is already effectively permitted in the cases discussed above 
(withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment and administration of a 
lethal dose of palliative care). Again the distinction is proven to be arbitrary, 
unjustified and the cause of severe unfairness at end of life. This unfairness is further 
evidenced by the increase in death tourism and the DPP‘s prosecutorial policy, which 
I argue, attempts to alleviate the unjust situation by effectively exempting criminal 
liability for compassionately motivated assisted suicide by a family member. 
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269 As demonstrated in Chapter Six. 
96 
 
 
 
7.2 The Unfairness is Unjustifiable 
 
Part Two of the thesis analysed two common defences of the current legal position on 
end of life, revealing that neither can sufficiently justify this unfairness. The first 
defence discussed was appeals to ‗the rights of the self‘, which defend the crime of 
assisted suicide because to allow such practices would harm the rights of the suicidal 
person. Two of these duty-based approaches were discussed in Chapter Five. Firstly, 
adherents of the human dignity as constraint position claim that allowing assisted 
suicide would damage the dignity of the person whose life is taken. However, it was 
demonstrated that such arguments are deeply flawed, given that no clear and 
accessible definition of ‗human dignity‘ actually exists.270 The very existence of the 
opposing ‗dignity as empowerment‘ theory evidences the extreme disparities between 
differing definitions. Secondly, the more specific sanctity of life doctrine also failed to 
act as a persuasive defence of the current, unfair, legal position. Examination of the 
theory itself shows it uses arbitrary and unworkable distinctions which would be 
almost impossible to incorporate into the legal regulation of end of life practices.
271
 
Furthermore, the sanctity of life position itself is incompatible with the current law in 
other areas. An examination of both the Abortion Act 1967 and s.1 of the Suicide Act 
1961 show that the current law permits the intentional killing of an innocent human 
being, yet this is the very practice the sanctity of life position prohibits. Consequently, 
this thesis has established that both the broader human dignity approach and the 
sanctity of life position fail to adequately justify the unfair legal position outlined in 
Part One. 
Chapter Six assessed appeals to the rights of others, and in particular, the 
slippery slope arguments. As explained, this approach prohibits a seemingly 
innocuous, or perhaps even desirable practice, because to allow such a practice would 
inevitably lead to another, undesirable practice. In the end of life context, assisted 
suicide is the innocuous or even desirable practice which must remain prohibited, in 
order to prevent a slide down the slippery slope leading to the practice of NVAE, 
IVAE or even intentional killing of competent persons against their wishes. Again this 
approach was shown to be insufficient to defend the current legal unfairness. The 
logical slippery slope, as expounded by Keown, is severely flawed in its reasoning. 
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The empirical slippery slope was also shown to be inherently defective due to the 
extreme difficulty of obtaining persuasive empirical data in such a controversial 
domain. What is more, the debate is often framed around the damage that may be 
caused to others in society as oppose to the harm that is actually being caused to those 
denied access to assistance. Claims to the slippery slope are simply not persuasive 
enough to justify the unfair situation caused by the current law.  
 
7.3 A Way Forward 
 
This thesis has established that the current law regarding ending one‘s own life is 
unfair, and this unfairness cannot be defended by reference to a wider concept of the 
‗rights of the self‘ or the ‗rights of others‘: there is unjustifiable injustice. The very 
fact that such unfairness exists, urges a change in the law. The situation whereby a 
person‘s medical and physical circumstances affect the legality of their decision to 
seek assistance in ending life should not be allowed to persist. Those who are able 
bodied can lawfully commit suicide.
272
 Those who are receiving life-sustaining 
medical treatment can lawfully refuse it.
273
 Those requiring palliative care can 
lawfully request a lethal dose.
274
 The small group of individuals who fall outside of 
these categories are denied access to control over their final moments, a denial which 
forces them to endure an emotionally horrific end.  
 Further need for a change in the law is evidenced by the ever-increasing 
number of people travelling abroad to receive assistance. The current unfair situation 
caused by the law has seen a rise in death tourism, with many severely disabled 
people now having no other choice than to travel a foreign country to end their lives. 
The added financial and emotional burdens this creates for these families are another 
factor which urges legal change. Moreover, the DPP‘s prosecutorial guidelines, which 
I have argued effectively legalise compassionately motivated assistance, further 
entrench the need for change.
275
 Although the document was created to give clarity to 
individuals (as directed by the Lords in Purdy) the situation remains unclear.
276
 
Would an individual who compassionately and reluctantly assisted in the suicide of a 
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family member in the UK be prosecuted? If the family member were to receive a 
large financial gain from the suicide, would this be cause for prosecution? While 
assumptions can be made over the policy factors for and against, the answers to this, 
and many other questions, remain speculative. Until there is a greater degree of 
clarity, individuals are forced, if they wish to remain on the right side of the law, to 
‗play it safe‘ and endure the extra financial and emotional burdens of travelling 
abroad. It is evident that a change in this area of law is long overdue. 
The first and most obvious possibility is the introduction of new legislation 
which decriminalises assisted suicide or permits such practices providing certain 
conditions are met. However, given the continual rejection of such Bills in 
Parliament, it is suggested that a change in this bold form is extremely unlikely. For 
example, Lord Joffe introduced a stream of Bills with the aim of remedying the 
unfairness at end of life. However, the Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill, introduced in 
2003, did not proceed past the 2
nd
 reading. In 2004, a new Bill was initiated - the 
Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, but this Bill was unable to proceed due to a 
shortage of Parliamentary time.
277
 Following this, a third Bill was defeated in the 
House of Lords by 148 votes to 100 in 2005.
278
 More recently, when debating the 
Coroners and Justice Bill in Parliament, Lord Falconer attempted to make an 
amendment to the Bill which would have removed the possibility of prosecution from 
friends or relatives who helped a terminally ill person to go abroad to seek assisted 
suicide. Again, this suggestion was defeated by 191 votes to 141. Reforming the law 
on end of life is a daunting and controversial step which Parliament appears reluctant 
to make.  
There is, however, an alternative approach which has been touched upon in 
this thesis. When addressing the unfairness felt by both Diane Pretty and Debbie 
Purdy in their legal battles, it became clear that the justification for prohibiting 
assisted suicide is built upon the idea that other vulnerable people would be at risk if it 
were legalised. Chapter Six focuses solely on this idea that the current legal position 
is justified, as it prevents ‗harm to others‘. However, the discussions revealed that the 
potential harm that may be done by the legalisation of assisted suicide ignores the 
actual harm that is being done to those individuals denied access to assistance. The 
courts in Purdy and Pretty focussed on the potential of other weak, vulnerable and 
                                               
277 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004-05. 
278 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2005-06. 
99 
 
 
 
perhaps elderly people who may be coerced if assisted suicide were legal, but there 
was no explanation of why this risk of harm outweighs the actual harm currently being 
inflicted.
279
 
 A possible way forward is to reframe the debate on assisted suicide with the 
individual who requires assistance being placed at the centre. Instead of focussing on 
possible future harm, focus on the actual current harm being imposed on the people 
who cannot exercise free choice over the end of their lives. Recognising the 
vulnerability of these people provides a possible way of altering the end of life debate. 
Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits the infliction of inhumane or degrading 
treatment on any individual, is a possible tool in this reconstruction. A potential way 
forward is to argue that the law which criminalises assisted suicide inflicts an 
inhumane and degrading life upon those who no longer wish to continue living. 
Consequently, the law is a breach of this integral human right and must be altered to 
permit assisted suicide.  
 A potential criticism of such an approach is the unlikelihood of any court 
accepting that the state‘s positive obligation to prevent inhumane or degrading 
treatment extends to allowing the practice of assisted suicide, a position held by Lord 
Bingham in Pretty.
280
 However, considering the significance of the right and the harm 
being caused, this response is contentious. Moreover, the positive obligation of the 
state need not go so far as providing such assistance in suicide, merely to permit such 
practices. In any event, this possibility of reframing the debate on assisted suicide has 
yet to be fully explored. It is an avenue which could be the much needed initiation for 
a change in the law on assisted suicide, which is currently indefensibly unfair, 
hopelessly arbitrary and inflicts severe harm upon those who are trapped in a life they 
no longer wish to live. Unfortunately, due to constraints of length, the possibility of 
refocusing the end of life debate has merely been touched upon in this thesis, but is 
perhaps a proposal for another day.  
 
 
                                               
279 See Chapter Six. 
280 R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61 at [15]. 
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